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COMMENT 
HOLLAND v. FLORIDA:  A PRISONER’S LAST 
CHANCE, ATTORNEY ERROR, AND THE 
ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH 
PENALTY ACT’S ONE-YEAR STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS PERIOD FOR FEDERAL HABEAS 
CORPUS REVIEW 
Marni von Wilpert* 
 
When should a prisoner be held accountable for his attorney’s 
negligence or misconduct?  Since the mid-1990’s, courts throughout the 
nation were deciding this question, after a growing tide of attorneys failed 
to meet the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s one-year 
statute of limitations when filing federal habeas corpus petitions on behalf 
of their incarcerated clients.  In Holland v. Florida, the Supreme Court 
decided once and for all when a prisoner would be given another chance to 
file his habeas corpus petition through the doctrine of equitable tolling 
when the only reason his petition was late was the fault of his attorney.  
This Comment explores the issues raised by the Holland decision.  In doing 
so, this Comment analyzes the principles of agency law and professional 
responsibility—the foundations of the attorney-client relationship—and 
raises questions as to whether these principles are properly applied to 
incarcerated clients in the post-conviction context.  This Comment 
ultimately concludes that while Holland was properly decided, the Court 
misapplied agency law to support its decision and did not go far enough in 
extending the protection of equitable tolling to all prisoners who have been 
turned away from the courts because they detrimentally relied on their 
defaulting attorneys. 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2011, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2005, University of 
California at Berkeley.  I wish to thank my wonderful mentor Professor Bruce Green for his 
tremendous support and encouragement.  I would not be the student I am today, and the 
future attorney I hope to be, without his guidance.  I am also grateful for my wonderful 
family and the best friends in the world who have displayed endless patience in listening to 
and fostering my ideas. 
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In February of 1996, Raymond Powell and James Wright engaged in an 
argument with Aaron Jones and Marquise McVea that escalated and ended 
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in gunfire.1  After the shooting stopped, McVea was dead and Jones was 
injured.  Raymond Powell was convicted of murder and attempted murder 
and sentenced to ninety-five years in prison.2  Jones, the attempted murder 
victim, testified at Powell’s trial that he was an innocent victim and that he 
did not possess or draw a weapon at any time during the altercation.3  One 
year later, Jones testified as a defense witness in an unrelated handgun 
prosecution.  In that case, Jones changed his story and testified that he did 
in fact have a gun on his person the day McVea was killed, but that he did 
not draw his weapon.4  Two months later at James Wright’s trial, Jones 
ultimately testified that he and McVea were both drug dealers, that the 
verbal altercation with Powell and Wright was over drug turf, that 
everybody including himself had drawn their guns, and that he had 
previously lied under oath.5 
In light of Jones’s new testimony, Powell requested an attorney so that he 
could pursue post-conviction relief on the grounds that newly discovered 
evidence entitled him to a new trial.6  The trial court appointed a public 
defender.7  In 2000, Powell’s attorney filed a motion for post-conviction 
relief in the trial court.  The court then ordered discovery relating to Jones’s 
perjured testimony.8  Powell’s attorney then requested an indefinite stay on 
the proceedings and told Powell that his case was “on hold until I can get to 
it which will be awhile since I have at least 23 unreviewed cases ahead of 
you.”9  Powell wrote to his attorney several times about his case.  Each 
time, his attorney responded that he still had other cases to finish before he 
could review Powell’s case.10  Two years later, Powell’s attorney still had 
not made any progress on his case and his petition was dismissed by the 
court.11 
Powell then filed a pro se writ of habeas corpus in federal court in 
2002.12  However, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 (AEDPA) provides that state and federal prisoners have only one year 
from the date their convictions become final to file habeas petitions in 
federal court.13  Powell’s convictions became final in 1999, and in the two 
 
 1. Powell v. State, 714 N.E.2d 624, 626 (Ind. 1999). 
 2. Id. at 625. 
 3. Id. at 626. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Powell v. Davis, 415 F.3d 722, 725 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id.  The procedural mechanism for filing a federal habeas petition challenging a state 
court’s judgment is 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006).  The analogous provision for federal prisoners 
is found in id. § 2255. 
 13. Id. § 2244(d)(1).  The corresponding limitations period for prisoners in federal 
custody is id. § 2255. 
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years that his attorney was neglecting his case, the statute of limitations for 
federal court had run.14 
Since the Indiana Supreme Court had affirmed his conviction,15 a federal 
habeas corpus petition was Powell’s last option for post-conviction relief.  
The district court appointed a new attorney, who argued that Powell’s 
circumstances warranted the equitable tolling16 of AEDPA’s statute of 
limitations because the only reason his petition was late was his previous 
attorney’s negligence in permitting his case to languish.17  The U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied Powell’s plea, reasoning that 
attorney error is attributable to the client and thus is not a circumstance that 
will excuse an untimely petition.18  The court held that counsel’s failure to 
do any work on the case was either negligence or legal error, but in neither 
case would it warrant equitable tolling.19 
Because of his attorney’s negligence, Powell was out of time.  His 
conviction stands, and Raymond Powell will spend the rest of his life in 
prison. 
Powell’s case illustrates the recent legal controversy among the federal 
appellate courts that the Supreme Court finally decided in Holland v. 
Florida.20  This Comment discusses one of the central questions the Court 
addressed in Holland:  when a prisoner’s failure to file a timely habeas 
corpus petition is solely the fault of the prisoner’s criminal defense 
attorney, should the courts deny the petition as untimely, or alternatively, 
use their equitable powers to give the prisoner another chance and allow his 
petition to be heard on the merits?21  In a divided opinion, the Court held 
that if an attorney’s conduct in failing to file a timely petition rises to the 
level of professional misconduct, equitable tolling may be warranted.22 
An analysis of the Holland decision requires a basic understanding of the 
issues raised in the case.  Part I of this Comment discusses the enactment of 
AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations period, and the subsequent trend 
of defense attorney default in failing to meet the statutory filing deadline.  
This part also reviews the doctrine of equitable tolling as it applies in the 
AEDPA litigation context, as well as the doctrine’s “extraordinary 
circumstances” and due diligence requirements.  Because the Court relies 
on agency law in the Holland decision, Part I includes a discussion of 
agency law as the foundation of the attorney-client relationship, and the 
implications of the Holland decision for prisoners who detrimentally rely 
 
 14. Powell, 415 F.3d at 726. 
 15. Powell v. State, 714 N.E.2d 624, 630 (Ind. 1999). 
 16. Equitable tolling is an equitable remedy the court can use to allow the prisoner 
another chance to file a habeas petition, even though the statutory limitations period has 
passed, if in the particular situation, applying the statute rigidly would be fundamentally 
unfair to the prisoner.  See infra Part I.B. 
 17. Powell, 415 F.3d at 726. 
 18. Id. at 727. 
 19. Id. 
 20. 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010). 
 21. Id. at 2554. 
 22. Id. 
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on their attorneys to further their habeas corpus claims.  Part II details the 
factual backdrop of the Holland decision, discusses the arguments each 
party raised in their respective briefs, and explores the majority, concurring, 
and dissenting opinions.  Part III analyzes the Holland decision and 
evaluates the rationales set forth by the various opinions.  Finally, Part IV 
concludes by proposing an alternative rule to the negligence/misconduct 
standard recognized in Holland.  This Comment instead recommends a 
balanced approach to equitable tolling that permits prisoners’ habeas 
petitions to be heard on the merits, while deterring attorney default through 
the direct enforcement of the rules of professional conduct. 
I.  AEDPA’S ONE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND THE ALARMING 
TREND OF ATTORNEYS WHO FAIL TO MEET ITS DEADLINE 
Part I.A briefly discusses the history and purpose of the writ of habeas 
corpus and AEDPA’s establishment of a one-year statute of limitations 
period on federal habeas corpus review.  This part also explains the 
practical need for competent attorney involvement in filing meritorious 
federal habeas corpus petitions.  This part also illustrates, however, the 
disconcerting trend of attorney default in meeting the limitations deadline 
since AEDPA’s enactment.  Part I.B describes the Supreme Court’s pre-
Holland jurisprudence in cases of attorney default in meeting AEDPA’s 
one-year deadline, including the extraordinary circumstances and due 
diligence requirements.  Part I.B also discusses the circuit split that led to 
the Holland decision as well as the Court’s reliance on agency law to draw 
a distinction between simple attorney negligence and egregious misconduct 
when determining whether to give a prisoner a second chance by allowing 
his untimely habeas corpus petition to be heard on the merits. 
A.  Attorney Default in Meeting the One-Year Limitations Period for 
Federal Habeas Corpus Review 
Lawyers are professionals who are trusted with the societal responsibility 
of promoting and implementing the administration of justice.23  However, 
in the past fourteen years since a statute of limitations was placed on federal 
habeas corpus review, criminal defense attorneys throughout the nation 
have failed to file their clients’ federal habeas corpus petitions on time.  An 
understanding of the underlying purpose of the writ of habeas corpus and 
the lawyer’s role in habeas proceedings is integral to a full analysis of the 
Holland decision.  This part discusses AEDPA’s one-year statute of 
limitations on federal habeas corpus petitions, and the consequences for 
incarcerated clients when their attorneys fail to meet AEDPA’s deadline. 
 
 23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS Introduction (2000). 
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1.  The Lawyer’s Role in Habeas Corpus Proceedings:  The Need for 
Competent Attorneys 
In the last thirty years, the number of prisoners in the United States has 
increased dramatically.  In 1972, roughly 330,000 people were incarcerated, 
and by 2006 there were about 2.3 million people in jails and prisons.24  Yet 
despite the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel,25 
criminal defense systems for indigent defendants routinely operate at 
substandard levels and provide defendants with gravely inadequate 
representation.26  Due to an increase in the number of criminal defendants 
and a decrease in the adequacy of indigent representation, many defendants 
face an increased risk of wrongful conviction.27  As a result, many people 
have likely been wrongly imprisoned due to ineffective legal assistance.28  
For example, a report on indigent defense systems produced by the 
American Bar Association (ABA) estimated that the national annual 
number of wrongful convictions in serious felony cases may be as high as 
10,000.29 
The increased risk of wrongful convictions makes access to federal 
habeas corpus review essential, as it is often a prisoner’s last chance to 
appeal an unjust incarceration.  Accordingly, the fundamental purpose of 
the writ of habeas corpus is to protect the fundamental right to liberty.30  
 
 24. See Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to 
Collateral Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 340 (2006); see also 
Giovanna Shay, Ad Law Incarcerated, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 329, 336–337 (2009) 
(noting that “[t]he number of incarcerated Americans increased by a factor of seven between 
1970 and 2007, resulting in 1 of every 131 Americans being incarcerated in prison or jail by 
mid-year  2007”); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 
REVIEW:  CHALLENGING STATE COURT CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS vi (1995), available at 
http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/criminal&CISOPTR=
103 (predicting that habitual offender statutes and “three strikes” laws are likely to increase 
the proportion of prisoners with life sentences and thus increase the total prison population 
as fewer prisoners are exiting prison systems).  
 25. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (holding that “the right to 
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel”) (citing McMann v. Richardson, 
397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)). 
 26. See AM. BAR ASS’N, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE:  AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST 
FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 7 (2004) [hereinafter GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE]; see also Dennis E. 
Curtis & Judith Resnik, Grieving Criminal Defense Lawyers, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1615, 
1619 (2002). 
 27. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 38; see generally Bruce A. Green, 
Criminal Neglect:  Indigent Defense from a Legal Ethics Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169 
(2003). 
 28. See Stevenson, supra note 24, at 344–45 (“[E]xamples abound of capital defendants 
represented by sleeping attorneys, drunk attorneys, attorneys largely unfamiliar with death 
penalty law and procedure, and attorneys who otherwise could not provide the assurance of 
reliability or fairness that criminal proceedings require.”) (internal citations omitted); see 
also Curtis & Resnik, supra note 26, at 1619 (explaining that many defense attorneys cannot 
spend adequate time on each client by describing one lawyer who was assigned 1600 
misdemeanor cases in a single year). 
 29. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 3. 
 30. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400–02 (1963) (stating that the writ of habeas corpus is 
“inextricably intertwined with the growth of fundamental rights of personal liberty”). 
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Thus the writ of habeas corpus is used to prevent unlawful detention by 
ensuring that a person is not in custody in violation of the Constitution, 
laws, or treaties of the United States.31  The writ of habeas corpus is not a 
direct appellate review of a criminal proceeding;32 rather it is a prisoner-
initiated civil action, which provides collateral review of the legality of 
criminal judgments.33  In a habeas proceeding, both state and federal 
prisoners may petition a federal court to determine whether the 
imprisonment violates their constitutional rights.34 
Prisoners may, if they desire, proceed in habeas litigation pro se.  
However, commentators have found that, in general, pro se petitioners 
cannot successfully navigate the complex habeas corpus procedures.  For 
example, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association once remarked 
that “[v]irtually all habeas corpus petitioners are prisoners.  Many are 
illiterate, ignorant, and confused.  Some are retarded, mentally ill, insane, or 
physically incapacitated.  To them, the legal system is an unintelligible 
morass.  Indeed, concepts of by-pass, forfeiture, waiver, and exhaustion, as 
well as underlying substantive claims, are complicated ideas.”35  Another 
commentator noted that proceeding pro se in habeas litigation is impractical 
because post-conviction procedures are generally marked by strict fact-
specific pleading standards, intricate exhaustion requirements, “and other 
technical pitfalls that cannot practicably be navigated without highly skilled 
counsel.”36 
Furthermore, AEDPA’s procedural requirements are so complicated that 
they are sometimes misunderstood even by attorneys, let alone pro se 
prisoners.  For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
once commented on the complexity of the statute when it stated that, “Even 
with the benefit of legal training, ready access to legal materials and the aid 
of four years of additional case law, an informed calculation of [the 
prisoner’s] tolling period evaded both his appointed counsel and the 
expertise of a federal magistrate judge.”37  Due to its complexity and 
resulting confusion, the Supreme Court itself has reviewed AEDPA’s 
 
 31. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006). 
 32. Riddle v. Dyche, 262 U.S. 333, 336 (1923) (stating that the “writ of habeas corpus is 
not a proceeding in the original criminal prosecution but an independent civil suit”) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 33. See RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, 1 FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE 16 (2001). 
 34. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2254(a). 
 35. The Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1982:  Hearing on S. 2216 Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 198 (1982) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 2216] (statement of 
Phylis Skloot Bamberger on behalf of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association); 
see also Michael Mello & Donna Duffy, Suspending Justice:  The Unconstitutionality of the 
Proposed Six-Month Time Limit on the Filing of Habeas Corpus Petitions by State Death 
Row Inmates, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 451, 481–84 (1990–1991) (noting that 
many habeas petitioner “inmates are illiterate, uneducated, mentally impaired, or any 
combination of the three”). 
 36. See Stevenson, supra note 24, at 354. 
 37. Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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limitations period twelve times since its enactment fourteen years ago.38  
Because of its complicated requirements, prisoners are virtually compelled 
to entrust their case to an attorney in order to navigate the federal habeas 
corpus system. 
The assistance of competent criminal defense attorneys is not only 
advantageous to providing prisoners with a fair process, but also integral to 
the public’s positive perception of the judicial system itself.39  For example, 
the Open Society Institute recently published a public opinion study, which 
found that a majority of Americans believe the provision of adequate legal 
help for those who need it is fundamental to the fair administration of 
justice.40  Moreover, the criminal justice system reduces litigation costs and 
runs more efficiently when qualified attorneys represent the litigants in 
habeas proceedings.41  For these reasons, and the important purpose of 
protecting the fundamental right to liberty, it is a practical necessity that 
prisoners have the assistance of a competent attorney when filing habeas 
corpus petitions. 
2.  On Your Mark, Get Set, Go!:  AEDPA’s One-Year Statute of 
Limitations 
AEDPA was passed in 1996 due to pressure to reform habeas corpus law 
after the perpetrator of the 1995 bombing of the Oklahoma federal building 
was convicted and sentenced to death.42  Specifically, congressional 
representatives sought to end the lengthy appeals in capital cases by 
enacting legislation to reduce delay in the completion of death sentences.43  
 
 38. See Anne R. Traum, Last Best Chance for the Great Writ:  Equitable Tolling and 
Federal Habeas Corpus, 68 MD. L. REV. 545, 553 (2009). 
 39. See Stevenson, supra note 24, at 342. 
 40. BELDEN RUSSONELLO & STEWART, OPEN SOC’Y INST. & NAT’L LEGAL AID AND 
DEFENDER ASS’N, DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MESSAGE FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE:  ANALYSIS OF 
NATIONAL SURVEY 8 (2001), available at http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/
1211996548.53/Polling%20results%20report.pdf. 
 41. See Federal Habeas Corpus Reform:  Eliminating Prisoners’ Abuse of the Judicial 
Process:  Hearing on S. 623 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 89 (1995) 
[hereinafter Hearings on S. 623] (statement of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, former Att’y Gen. 
of the United States) (“[A]ssignment of competent counsel in post-conviction proceedings 
actually speeds capital cases along and reduces their cost.”); see also James A. Cohen, 
Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization “Officer of the Court”, 
48 BUFF L. REV. 349, 350 (2000) (explaining that “[l]awyers do perform a screening or gate-
keeping function for the courts, society, and clients [and] . . . [c]ourts, therefore, have some 
assurance that complaints and defenses have some merit”).  Furthermore, Congress included 
an “opt-in” provision in AEDPA allowing states to take advantage of more restrictive habeas 
corpus procedures if they agree to provide post-conviction counsel for prisoners.  For a 
description of AEDPA’s “opt-in” provision, see generally Burke W. Kappler, Small Favors:  
Chapter 154 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the States, and the Right 
to Counsel, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 467 (2000). 
 42. Lisa L. Bellamy, Playing for Time:  The Need for Equitable Tolling of the Habeas 
Corpus Statute of Limitations, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 10 (2004). 
 43. See Hearings on S. 623, supra note 41, at 2 (statement of statement of Sen. Orrin G. 
Hatch) (arguing that prisoners’ “abuse of habeas corpus litigation, particularly in those cases 
involving lawfully imposed death sentences, has . . . drained State criminal justice resources, 
and taken a dreadful toll on victims’ families”); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 
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At the time, the popular perception about capital prisoners encompassed the 
belief that they filed spurious and repeated habeas corpus petitions as a 
tactic for delaying their punishment.44  Indeed, the title of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee hearings leading up to AEDPA’s enactment reflected 
the congressional sentiment at the time:  “Federal Habeas Corpus Reform:  
Eliminating Prisoners’ Abuse of the Judicial Process.”45  Therefore, 
AEDPA was enacted to ensure the finality of state court judgments by 
creating procedural barriers to federal review of those judgments.46  In 
order to reduce the repeated filings and the delay between them, Congress 
included an unprecedented one-year statute of limitations provision for 
federal habeas corpus review.47 
The focus of this Comment is on the subsequent failure of criminal 
defense attorneys to comply with AEDPA’s statutory limitations period.  
 
24, at 21 (stating that concerns about the lengthy process of death penalty cases dominate 
policy discussions about habeas corpus reform). 
 44. See Bellamy, supra note 42, at 10; Curtis & Resnik, supra note 26, at 1625 
(explaining that Congress has codified procedural obstacles to prisoner litigation on the 
prevailing view that prisoners complain too much). 
 45. See Hearings on S. 623, supra note 41, at I. 
 46. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000) (reasoning that AEDPA’s purpose is 
to “limit the scope of federal intrusion into state criminal adjudications and to safeguard the 
States’ interest in the integrity of their criminal and collateral proceedings”); see also Panel 
Discussion, Capital Punishment:  Is There Any Habeas Left in This Corpus?, 27 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 560, 565 (1996) [hereinafter Panel Discussion] (Professor Larry Yackle stated that, 
“The drafters of this bill obviously want this provision to restrict a prisoner’s ability to get an 
evidentiary hearing in federal court”); Traum, supra note 38, at 547 (explaining that the 
function of AEDPA’s statute of limitations is to “guard[] the door to federal habeas 
review”). 
 47. The one-year limitations period is codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2006), which 
states: 
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas 
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The 
limitation period shall run from the latest of–  
  (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 
review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 
  (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State 
action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if 
the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 
  (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized 
by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme 
Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 
  (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented 
could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.  
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 
        Likewise, the statute of limitations provision for federal prisoners is found in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255 (2006).  It is important to note that before AEDPA, neither Congress nor the judiciary 
had ever imposed a time limit on federal habeas corpus petitions.  See Bellamy, supra note 
42, at 12.  Instead, the Supreme Court had consistently maintained that the right to habeas 
corpus review could not be conditioned on the passage of time. See Day v. McDonough, 547 
U.S. 198, 215 (2006) (noting that the Court had repeatedly asserted that “the passage of time 
alone could not extinguish the habeas corpus rights of a person subject to unconstitutional 
incarceration”) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 264 (1986) 
(declining to adopt a judicial rule which would “condition the grant of relief upon the 
passage of time between a conviction and the filing of a petition for federal habeas corpus”). 
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The prevalence of this attorney default is evidenced by the fact that virtually 
every federal appellate court has addressed this topic in lengthy opinions, 
many of them on multiple occasions.48  Moreover, this problem became an 
issue of national concern to the point that the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Holland v. Florida to determine whether equitable tolling of 
AEDPA’s statute of limitations is warranted in cases of attorney default.49 
There are a variety of explanations for this trend of defense attorney 
default, ranging from the inability of appointed counsel to manage 
abysmally large caseloads,50 to the active misconduct of attorneys who take 
their clients’ retainers and run.51  In Holland, the aggrieved prisoner asked 
the Court to apply equitable tolling in his case, which would give him an 
opportunity to have his habeas petition heard on the merits, after his 
attorney refused to answer his letters and phone calls over a period of two 
years, during which time AEDPA’s limitations period elapsed.52  Attorney 
error in calculating the one-year period also accounts for a large portion of 
the number of late habeas filings.53  This Comment does recognize and 
commend the incredibly hardworking public defenders and criminal defense 
attorneys who have unimaginably large case loads and work tirelessly to 
serve their clients.  But regardless of the reason for their attorneys’ failures, 
prisoners around the country have been asking the federal courts for 
equitable tolling to give them a chance to have their habeas petitions heard 
on the merits after their attorneys fail.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court 
developed a two-prong rule for applying equitable tolling in AEDPA 
litigation generally.  A brief explanation of this rule is necessary to 
understand its application to cases of attorney default, as the Court did in 
Holland.  The next part of this Comment describes the Supreme Court’s 
equitable tolling jurisprudence in AEDPA litigation and the particular 
 
 48. See, e.g., Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2008); Fleming v. Evans, 481 
F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2007); Trapp v. Spencer, 479 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2007); Sellers v. Burt, 
168 Fed. App’x 132 (8th Cir. 2006); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2003); 
Modrowski v. Mote, 322 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 2003); David v. Hall, 318 F.3d 343 (1st Cir. 
2003); Fierro v. Cockrell, 294 F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 2002); Smaldone v. Senkowski, 273 F.3d 
133 (2d Cir. 2001); Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2000); Miller v. N.J. State 
Dep’t of Corr., 145 F.3d 616 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 49. Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. granted 130 S. Ct. 
398 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2009) (No. 09-5327). 
 50. See Panel Discussion, supra note 46, at 563 (stating that due to the complicated 
pleading requirements of a habeas petition a one-year period will be “nearly impossible to 
comply with”). 
 51. See, e.g., Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 797–800 (deciding whether equitable tolling applied 
when an attorney took the prisoner’s fee payment and had not done any work on the case for 
over a year). 
 52. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2554–60 (2010). 
 53. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Florida 549 U.S. 327, 336–37 (2007) (deciding whether an 
attorney’s mistaken belief about the triggering of AEDPA’s limitations period should excuse 
the prisoner’s late petition); see also Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 922–23 (9th Cir. 2002); 
Smaldone, 273 F.3d at 138–39.  As discussed in Part II infra, one of Holland’s attorney’s 
many errors included miscalculating Holland’s AEDPA time period. See Holland, 130 S. Ct. 
at 2558.  Indeed, due to the statute’s complexity and resulting confusion, the Supreme Court 
itself has reviewed AEDPA’s limitations period twelve times since its enactment over 
thirteen years ago. See Traum, supra note 38, at 553. 
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evidentiary requirements that a prisoner must meet in order to obtain 
equitable relief from his attorney’s failure to file his habeas petition in a 
timely fashion. 
B.  Development of a Doctrine:  The Use of Agency Law in Applying 
Equitable Tolling to Cases of Attorney Default 
  Equitable tolling is a remedy that may be awarded at the discretion of 
the court and allows a petitioner to assert a claim after the statutory 
limitations period has expired.54  This doctrine permits a court to toll a 
statutory limitations period in situations where the strict enforcement of the 
statute would operate unfairly or result in gross injustice.55  Thus courts 
have used their discretion to equitably toll AEDPA’s statute of limitations 
when a habeas petitioner “has been unfairly prevented from asserting his 
rights in a timely fashion.”56  In adjudicating whether a prisoner was 
unfairly prevented from filing a timely habeas petition, it is the litigant’s 
reason for the late filing that is scrutinized by the court.57 
As was the story in Holland, in the past fourteen years since AEDPA’s 
enactment there has been a growing trend of equitable tolling requests from 
prisoners who wish to have their untimely federal habeas corpus petitions 
heard on the merits.  In many cases, their reason for requesting equitable 
tolling is the negligent representation of their post-conviction attorneys.58  
As the Supreme Court held in Coleman v. Thompson,59 there is no Sixth 
Amendment right to post-conviction counsel, thus there is no ineffective 
assistance of counsel remedy in this context.60  Therefore, a prisoner’s only 
avenue to obtaining relief from his attorney’s negligent representation is an 
appeal to the courts for equitable tolling. 
The Supreme Court first addressed this specific issue—namely the 
equitable tolling of AEDPA’s limitations period on grounds of attorney 
default—in its 2007 decision in Lawrence v. Florida.61  Without actually 
 
 54. Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 319 (3d Cir. 2001); Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 
713 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that courts “can allow an untimely petition to proceed under the 
doctrine of equitable tolling”). 
 55. See, e.g., Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[E]quity must be 
reserved for those rare instances where . . . it would be unconscionable to enforce the 
limitation period against the party and gross injustice would result.”); Miller v. N.J. State 
Dep’t of Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 618 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that equitable tolling is only applied 
when the rigid application of the limitations period would be unfair). 
 56. Nara, 264 F.3d at 320. 
 57. Trapp v. Spencer, 479 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2007) (“In applying the equitable tolling 
doctrine, an important factor is the reason for the late filing.”). 
 58. See, e.g., Powell v. Davis, 415 F.3d 722, 726 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting petitioner’s 
argument that the state public defender’s negligence warranted equitable tolling); Smaldone 
v. Senkowski, 273 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that petitioner sought equitable 
tolling because of his attorney’s mistaken belief about the AEDPA statute). 
 59. 501 U.S. 722 (1991). 
 60. Id. at 752 (“There is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction 
proceedings.”). 
 61. 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007) (noting the petitioner’s argument that “his counsel’s 
mistake in miscalculating [AEDPA’s] limitations period entitles him to equitable tolling”). 
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deciding whether AEDPA was subject to equitable tolling, the Court 
articulated the following rule in Lawrence:  “To be entitled to equitable 
tolling, [the petitioner] must show ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights 
diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ 
and prevented timely filing.”62  Although the Court stated that it was not yet 
deciding whether equitable tolling was applicable to AEDPA’s statute of 
limitations,63 this rule had been followed by the district courts and circuit 
courts of appeals since the late 1990s,64 almost a decade before Lawrence 
was decided.  This rule was reaffirmed by the Court three years later in 
Holland, when it formally decided that AEDPA’s limitations period was 
subject to equitable tolling.65 
1.  Extraordinary Circumstances:  The Attorney’s Behavior 
In habeas corpus litigation, a prisoner is eligible for the remedy of 
equitable tolling only if he can prove that “extraordinary circumstances” 
prevented him from filing his habeas corpus petition on time.66  Although 
 
 62. Id. at 336 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). 
 63. Before the Court decided to apply equitable tolling in certain cases of attorney 
default, it had to determine whether equitable tolling was applicable to AEDPA’s limitations 
period at all.  The circuit courts of appeals had been applying equitable tolling to AEDPA’s 
limitations period since the late 1990s, and this issue was argued and finally decided in 
Holland.  See infra Part II for a description of Holland’s treatment of this issue.  The issue of 
whether AEDPA should be subject to equitable tolling at all is beyond the scope of this 
Comment, and indeed has been the sole subject of many pre-Holland academic discussions 
and articles.  The focus of this Comment, rather, is directed toward the attorney-client 
relationship in the post-conviction habeas corpus context, and the ever-increasing prevalence 
of substandard legal representation that requires the extraordinary remedy of equitable 
tolling in order to maintain the procedural fairness that the justice system demands.  For 
further discussions of equitable tolling’s general applicability to AEDPA’s statute of 
limitations, see generally Bellamy, supra note 42; Stevenson, supra note 24; Traum, supra 
note 38. 
 64. See, e.g., Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311, 1319 (11th Cir. 2008) (“This Court has 
used equitable tolling to extend the federal limitations period for prisoners seeking federal 
review of their state convictions . . . .”); Fleming v. Evans, 481 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 
2007) (“[S]ufficiently egregious misconduct on the part of a habeas petitioner’s counsel may 
justify equitable tolling of the AEDPA limitations period.”); Trapp v. Spencer, 479 F.3d 53, 
59 (1st Cir. 2007) (“In this circuit, we have allowed for equitable tolling of [AEDPA’s] 
limitations period . . . .”); United States v. Martin, 408 F.3d 1089, 1092 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(“‘The statute of limitations contained in § 2255 [AEDPA] is subject to equitable tolling.’” 
(quoting United States v. Battles, 362 F.3d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004))); Spitsyn v. Moore, 
345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he one-year statute of limitations for filing a habeas 
petition may be equitably tolled . . . .”); Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(stating that the court has discretion to apply principles of equity in AEDPA); Harris v. 
Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2000) (“As a general matter, principles of equitable 
tolling may . . . apply to excuse a plaintiff’s failure to comply with the strict requirements of 
[AEDPA’s] statute of limitations.”); Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(proclaiming that the Second Circuit agrees that AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling); 
Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1999) (explaining that under AEDPA, “[a] 
court can allow an untimely petition to proceed under the doctrine of equitable tolling”). 
 65. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010) (holding that AEDPA’s statute of 
limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2006), is subject to equitable tolling). 
 66. Id. at 2563; Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007); Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 
544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). 
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there is no single definition of “extraordinary circumstances,” courts have 
generally required that they be situations that are beyond the prisoner’s 
ability to control.67  For example, courts have allowed equitable tolling in 
AEDPA litigation when a court itself misled a prisoner about the habeas 
petition process,68 when a government official misled a prisoner,69 when a 
prisoner was denied access to his legal files,70 and when deficiencies in a 
prison library prevented a diligent pro se prisoner from learning about the 
limitations period.71  In these situations, prisoners were misled or 
obstructed by a state official, and thus the reasons for these prisoners’ 
untimely filings were beyond their control.72 
As was the case in Holland, many prisoners cite their attorney’s 
negligent or intentional bad faith conduct as extraordinary circumstances 
that prevented them from complying with AEDPA’s statutory limitations 
period.  Requesting equitable tolling on these grounds, however, led the 
Court in Holland to make a stark departure from its historical jurisprudence 
regarding claims of substandard legal representation.  Outside of the post-
conviction habeas corpus context, and indeed largely outside of the criminal 
justice context as a whole,73 the Court has disposed of similar claims of 
 
 67. See, e.g., Barreto-Barreto v. United States, 551 F.3d 95, 101 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(“[P]etitioners carry the burden of demonstrating that extraordinary circumstances beyond 
their control ‘prevented timely filing.’” (quoting Trenkler v. United States, 268 F.3d 16, 25 
(1st Cir. 2001))); Downs, 520 F.3d at 1319 (citing Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th 
Cir. 2000)) (explaining that the court’s precedents require not only extraordinary 
circumstances, but circumstances that are beyond the petitioner’s control); Spitsyn, 345 F.3d 
at 799 (holding that “the one-year statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition may be 
equitably tolled if ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it 
impossible to file a petition on time’” (quoting Brambles v. Duncan, 330 F.3d 1197, 1202 
(9th Cir. 2003))); Harris, 209 F.3d at 330 (explaining that equitable tolling is only 
appropriate when “‘extraordinary circumstances beyond plaintiffs’ control made it 
impossible to file the claims on time’” (quoting Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 
696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996))). 
 68. See, e.g., Prieto v. Quarterman, 456 F.3d 511, 514–15 (5th Cir. 2006) (applying 
equitable tolling because petitioner detrimentally relied on a misleading filing extension 
granted by the district court when filing his habeas petition). 
 69. Knight v. Schofield, 292 F.3d 709, 710, 712 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that equitable 
tolling was warranted when a government official, the Clerk of the State Supreme Court, had 
misled a petitioner about the habeas filing procedure). 
 70. Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 924–25 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 71. See Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 975 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that equitable 
tolling would be warranted by the extraordinary circumstances a prisoner faced while 
attempting to access the prison library to do legal research in order to determine his AEDPA 
deadline). 
 72. Spottsville v. Terry, 476 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that when a court 
misled the prisoner about the filing deadline, the prisoner’s subsequent late filing was “not 
his fault”). 
 73. At the criminal trial level, for example, criminal defendants are not bound to the 
consequences of their attorney’s substandard legal representation but instead may obtain a 
new trial if their attorney does not perform with “reasonably effective assistance.”  See 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  However, the Court later clarified in 
Coleman v. Thompson that its ruling was not based on the premise that when the attorney’s 
errors are egregious the attorney ceases to be an agent of the defendant, rather, it is the Sixth 
Amendment itself that requires responsibility for the attorney’s default to be imputed to the 
state. 501 U.S. 722, 754 (1991).  Nonetheless, the Strickland precedent still stands and is 
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negligent representation resulting in procedural default by invoking agency 
law in holding that clients are bound by their attorney’s acts or omissions.74  
Since the purpose of habeas corpus is to ensure fairness to prisoners in the 
criminal justice system,75 it follows that before Holland, the courts of 
appeals and the Supreme Court itself were struggling to determine whether 
it was fair to preclude a habeas petition because of attorney error in the 
post-conviction process.  Accordingly, the courts of appeals developed 
varying doctrines to deal with the claims of attorney default in meeting 
AEDPA’s limitations period.  The Supreme Court finally decided which 
approach to adopt in Holland. 
Long before Holland was decided, the Supreme Court and every circuit 
court of appeals to have decided an equitable tolling case based on a claim 
of attorney default held that simple attorney negligence was not an 
extraordinary circumstance, and thus did not warrant equitable tolling.76  
 
representative of the Court’s hesitation to hold criminal defendants responsible for the 
consequences of their attorney’s failures in many stages of the criminal justice system. 
 74. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336–37 (2007) (precluding equitable 
tolling for a petitioner when his attorney failed to file a timely habeas corpus petition on his 
behalf); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752–53 (holding that litigants must “bear the risk of attorney 
error that results in a procedural default”); Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 
91, 96 (1990) (precluding equitable tolling of an employment discrimination law’s 
limitations period when a petitioner’s attorney failed to file a timely complaint because the 
attorney was not in the country when the limitations period elapsed); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 
U.S. 400, 417–18 (1988) (striking down a litigant’s argument that the attorney’s sins should 
not be constructively attributed to the client because “[t]he argument that the client should 
not be held responsible for his lawyer’s misconduct strikes at the heart of the attorney-client 
relationship”); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 634–36 (1962) (holding that a 
litigant’s case was dismissed for failure to prosecute when his attorney failed to appear in a 
pretrial conference because in “our system of representative litigation . . . each party is 
deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent”).  See also Cohen, supra note 41, at 349 
(noting that “[t]he law of agency has governed American lawyers since before the 
Revolution”). 
 75. See 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 33, at 16. 
 76. Lawrence, 549 U.S. at 336–37; Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311, 1325 (11th Cir. 
2008) (holding that mere attorney negligence does not justify equitable tolling); Trapp v. 
Spencer, 479 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[M]istake by counsel in reading [AEDPA] or 
computing the time limit is, at most, a routine error and does not . . . [warrant] equitable 
tolling.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Fleming v. Evans, 481 F.3d 1249, 1255 (10th 
Cir. 2007) (“Habeas counsel’s negligence is not generally a basis for equitable tolling . . . .”); 
Sellers v. Burt, 168 F. App’x 132, 133 (8th Cir. 2006) (ineffective assistance of counsel 
generally does not warrant equitable tolling in habeas proceedings); Modrowski v. Mote, 322 
F.3d 965, 967–68 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that attorney negligence is not grounds for 
equitable tolling); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
ordinary attorney negligence will not justify equitable tolling); David v. Hall, 318 F.3d 343, 
346 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that principles of equitable tolling do not extend to excusable 
neglect); Fierro v. Cockrell, 294 F.3d 674, 683 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that an attorney’s 
erroneous interpretation of AEDPA’s statute of limitations cannot excuse the prisoner’s 
failure to file on time); Smaldone v. Senkowski, 273 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting 
that attorney error does not create the extraordinary circumstances equitable tolling 
requires); Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[A] mistake by a party’s 
counsel in interpreting a statute of limitations does not present the extraordinary 
circumstance beyond the party’s control where equity should step in . . . .”); Miller v. N.J. 
State Dep’t of Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 619 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that excusable neglect is not 
sufficient justification for equitable tolling). 
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Courts have defined attorney negligence to mean an attorney’s mistake in 
calculating the limitations period,77 an attorney’s erroneous interpretation of 
the statute,78 or other misunderstandings regarding AEDPA’s procedural 
requirements that result in untimely habeas filings.79  In these cases, the 
courts of appeals and the Supreme Court itself have historically invoked 
agency law, reasoning that attorney negligence is not an “extraordinary 
circumstance” that prevents a petitioner from filing on time because 
prisoners, as principals in the agency relationship, must supervise—and bear 
responsibility for—their attorneys’ acts or omissions.80 
Although courts have established that simple attorney negligence does 
not warrant equitable tolling, the courts of appeals before Holland had a 
much harder time deciding what to do when an attorney missed a prisoner’s 
AEDPA deadline because of egregious misconduct.  Before Holland, the 
Supreme Court had never addressed equitable tolling of AEDPA’s 
limitations period in the context of an attorney’s affirmative misconduct,81 
and the circuit courts of appeals took divergent approaches when 
adjudicating these cases.  A majority of the circuit courts allowed equitable 
tolling in circumstances of attorney misconduct,82 reasoning that 
 
 77. See Lawrence, 549 U.S. at 336–37 (holding that “[a]ttorney miscalculation is simply 
not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling”); David, 318 F.3d at 346 (holding that “a mistake 
by counsel in reading the statute or computing the time limit” does not warrant equitable 
tolling). 
 78. See Fierro, 294 F.3d at 683 (holding that an attorney’s erroneous interpretation of 
AEDPA’s statute of limitations provision cannot, on its own, excuse the prisoner’s failure to 
file on time). 
 79. See, e.g., Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 245–46, 249–50 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
an attorney’s mistaken belief that the mailbox rule in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(e) 
applies to AEDPA’s limitations period will not excuse an untimely habeas petition). 
 80. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991) (holding that attorney 
error is not grounds to excuse an untimely petition because “the attorney is the petitioner’s 
agent when acting, or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation”); Modrowski, 322 F.3d at 
968 (“[A]ttorney negligence is not extraordinary and clients, even if incarcerated, must 
‘vigilantly oversee,’ and ultimately bear responsibility for, their attorneys’ actions or 
failures.” (quoting Johnson v. McCaughtry, 265 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 2001))); Harris, 209 
F.3d at 331 (“[A] mistake by a party’s counsel in interpreting a statute of limitations does not 
present the extraordinary circumstance beyond the party’s control where equity should step 
in.”).  
 81. See Lawrence, 549 U.S. at 336 (addressing the question of whether an attorney’s 
error in miscalculating AEDPA’s limitations period entitles the petitioner to equitable 
tolling). 
 82. See, e.g., Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that 
“serious attorney misconduct may constitute an extraordinary circumstance for purposes of 
equitable tolling”); Fleming v. Evans, 481 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
“sufficiently egregious misconduct on the part of a habeas petitioner’s counsel may justify 
equitable tolling of the AEDPA limitations period”); United States v. Martin, 408 F.3d 1089, 
1093 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[S]erious attorney misconduct, as opposed to mere negligence, ‘may 
warrant equitable tolling.’”) (quoting Beery v. Ault, 312 F.3d 948, 952 (8th Cir. 2002)); 
Baldayaque v. United States, 338 F.3d 145, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that sufficiently 
egregious misconduct may justify the use of equitable tolling); Ford v. Hubbard, 330 F.3d 
1086, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that “there are instances in which an attorney’s failure to 
take necessary steps to protect his client’s interests is so egregious and atypical that the court 
may deem equitable tolling appropriate”); United States v. Wynn, 292 F.3d 226, 230 (5th 
Cir. 2002) (holding that an attorney’s deception is the sort of extraordinary circumstance that 
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misconduct is not attributable to the client because such attorney behavior 
constitutes the “extraordinary circumstances” required for equitable tolling.  
Again, while there is no single definition of attorney misconduct, courts 
have found misconduct occurs where the prisoner requests or demands that 
the attorney file a habeas petition, but for a variety of reasons the attorney 
never does.  For example, courts have found misconduct when an attorney 
affirmatively misleads the prisoner about the law,83 effectively abandons 
the case,84 or blatantly deceives or lies to his client about the status of his 
case.85  When granting equitable tolling in these circumstances, some courts 
have once again invoked agency law, reasoning that if an attorney acts in a 
manner completely adverse to the client, the attorney no longer functions as 
the client’s agent, rendering it improper to bind these incarcerated clients to 
the consequences of their attorney’s actions.86  As discussed in Part II 
supra, some of the Justices adopted this agency law reasoning in Holland. 
The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, consistently held that attorney 
default, whether due to negligence or misconduct, was always attributed to 
 
could warrant the use of equitable tolling); Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(holding that an attorney’s effective abandonment of the case may warrant equitable tolling). 
 83. Martin, 408 F.3d at 1094 (finding misconduct where an attorney told the prisoner 
that “there was no such thing as a one-year filing deadline”). 
 84. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding misconduct when 
an attorney accepted a retainer payment then failed to do any work or respond to prisoner’s 
letters or phone calls for over a year, by which time the deadline had lapsed); Nara, 264 F.3d 
at 320 (holding that equitable tolling would be justified if the petitioner’s attorney effectively 
abandoned the case). 
 85. Martin, 408 F.3d at 1094 (finding misconduct where the attorney lied to prisoner by 
telling him that he had filed the prisoner’s petition, which was not true); Wynn, 292 F.3d at 
230 (“Wynn’s allegation that he was deceived by his attorney into believing that a timely 
[habeas corpus] motion had been filed on his behalf presents a ‘rare and extraordinary 
circumstance’ beyond petitioner’s control that could warrant equitable tolling of the statute 
of limitations.”).  Notably, some of the courts of appeals found that an attorney’s behavior 
constitutes misconduct when an attorney violates the professional duties of care that she 
owes to the client.  See, e.g., Baldayaque, 338 F.3d at 152 (finding misconduct when the 
attorney violates the duty of loyalty that she, as an agent, owes to the client); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006) (“An agent has a fiduciary duty to act 
loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the agency relationship.”).  
The American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct state that a 
lawyer engages in professional misconduct when she violates or attempts to violate the Rules 
of Professional Conduct by breaching the duties attorneys owe to clients. MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2003).  The Court relied on these Model Rules when deciding to 
make an exception to agency principles in Strickland, and also adopted the Model Rules 
reasoning in Holland, citing an amicus brief written by a group of extremely astute legal 
ethics professors.  See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2564–65 (citing Brief for Legal 
Ethics Professors et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Holland v. Florida, 130 S. 
Ct. 2549 (2010) (No. 09-5237)); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) 
(referencing the “[p]revailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association 
standards”). 
 86. See Downs, 520 F.3d at 1321 (holding that “when an attorney’s conduct is so 
egregious it amounts to a de facto termination of representation, it would be improper to hold 
the client to the actions of his agent”); Baldayaque, 338 F.3d at 154 (“[W]hen an ‘agent acts 
in a manner completely adverse to the principal’s interest,’ the ‘principal is not charged with 
[the] agent’s misdeeds.’”) (Jacobs, J., concurring) (quoting Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Bonnanzio, 91 F.3d 296, 303 (2d Cir. 1996))). 
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the client and therefore never warranted the use of equitable tolling.87  Even 
though attorneys displayed the same unethical conduct as those in other 
circuit’s jurisdictions, the results for the prisoner were radically different in 
the Seventh Circuit, as prisoners were never granted equitable tolling no 
matter how severe the attorney’s misconduct.  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in 2009 to finally decide when a habeas petitioner would be 
bound by his attorney’s failures.88 
Although the Court spent a significant portion of its analysis in Holland 
determining whether the attorney’s behavior constituted “extraordinary 
circumstances,” the Court also evaluated the second prong of the equitable 
tolling analysis—whether the prisoner acted with “due diligence” in 
pursuing his rights.  The next section of this Comment addresses the 
prisoner’s duty to diligently pursue his rights, no matter how poorly the 
attorney is handling his case. 
2.  Due Diligence:  The Prisoner’s Behavior 
When Albert Holland’s attorney stopped answering his letters and phone 
calls, Holland began to worry.89  In an effort to try and force his attorney to 
work on his habeas petition, or at least return his letters and phone calls, 
Holland contacted the courts, their clerks, and the Florida State Bar 
reporting his attorney’s misconduct and asking for information about his 
case.90  When Holland learned that his attorney had missed AEDPA’s 
deadline, Holland immediately wrote his own pro se habeas motion, and 
filed it the next day.91  However, by this time it was too late, and the 
District Court dismissed Holland’s petition as untimely.92  The District 
Court refused to grant Holland equitable tolling on the grounds that he had 
not been diligent enough in pursuing his rights.93 
The second prong of the equitable tolling rule, which the Court expressed 
in Lawrence and later affirmed in Holland, requires a prisoner to show that 
he has been pursuing his rights diligently during the time that his attorney 
 
 87. See, e.g., Powell v. Davis, 415 F.3d 722, 727 (7th Cir. 2005) (“‘[A]ttorney 
misconduct, whether labeled negligent, grossly negligent, or willful, is attributable to the 
client’ and thus is not a circumstance beyond a petitioner’s control that might excuse an 
untimely petition.”) (quoting Modrowski v. Mote, 322 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2003)); 
United States v. 7108 W. Grand Ave., 15 F.3d 632, 634 (7th Cir. 1994) (precluding equitable 
tolling because the errors and misconduct of the lawyer redound upon and bind the principal 
(i.e., the client)). 
 88. Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. granted 130 S. Ct. 
398 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2009) (No. 09-5327).  See also Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2560 (“Because the 
[Eleventh Circuit] Court of Appeals’ application of the equitable tolling doctrine to instances 
of professional misconduct conflicts with the approach taken by other Circuits, we granted 
the petition [for certiorari].”). 
 89. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555. 
 90. Id. at 2555–57. 
 91. Id. at 2557. 
 92. Id. at 2559. 
 93. Id.  
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was neglecting his case.94  Before Holland, the circuit courts of appeals 
treated this due diligence requirement differently, and these divergent 
approaches generated an important question:  should the context of 
imprisonment be taken into account when evaluating a habeas petitioner’s 
due diligence? 
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits, for example, chose not to acknowledge a 
prisoner’s conditions of confinement when evaluating the diligence 
requirement.  In denying a prisoner’s argument that his confinement limited 
his ability to pursue his rights diligently, the Fifth Circuit stated that, 
“Congress knew AEDPA would affect incarcerated individuals with limited 
access to outside information.”95  Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has held 
that a prisoner can overcome even an attorney’s willful misconduct by 
diligently pursuing his rights in filing “protective” or duplicative pro se 
petitions if he fears his attorney will fail to file a timely petition on his 
behalf.96  The facts of Holland, however, make clear that the Seventh 
Circuit’s protective petition approach is not necessarily feasible, as every 
pro se petition Holland filed was dismissed by the District Court on the 
premise that prisoners who are represented by an attorney are not permitted 
to file pro se petitions.97 
The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, did consider the realities of prison 
life when evaluating a prisoner’s diligence in pursuing his constitutional 
habeas corpus claims.  For example, this circuit once remarked that 
“confinement makes compliance with procedural deadlines difficult 
because of restrictions on the prisoner’s ability to monitor the lawsuit’s 
progress.”98  Likewise, commentators and scholars have noted that because 
much of the attorney’s factual investigations, legal research, and document 
drafting is done outside of the courtroom, it is difficult for prisoners to 
monitor their attorneys’ progress on their cases. 99     
 
 94. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007). See also Bellamy, supra note 42, at 
29 (“[C]ourts frequently hold that despite the existence of extraordinary circumstances, 
prisoners’ delays do not warrant equitable tolling because they have not exercised reasonable 
diligence in pursuing their claims.”). 
 95. Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding the prisoner did not act 
with the requisite diligence even though the court “recognize[d] that Fisher’s incarceration 
prevented him from knowing sooner of AEDPA’s limitation period”). 
 96. See Powell v. Davis, 415 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2005); Modrowski v. Mote, 322 
F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that “petitioners bear ultimate responsibility for their 
[habeas corpus] filings, even if that means preparing duplicative petitions”). 
 97. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2556. 
 98. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
 99. See, e.g., Green, supra note 27, at 1171 (stating that “[i]t is hard for clients 
themselves . . . to know most of what happens from the time the lawyer is assigned to 
represent an indigent defendant until the time the defendant pleads guilty”); Curtis & Resnik, 
supra note 26, at 1620 (noting that in the context of the criminal justice system, “[i]ndividual 
clients, in turn, have little or no ability to monitor their own lawyers”). 
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II.  HOLLAND V. FLORIDA:  A CASE ANALYSIS 
A.  Statement of the Case 
Albert Holland’s story began in 1997, when he was convicted of murder 
and sentenced to death.100  Although Albert Holland was represented by an 
attorney, he filed a pro se habeas corpus petition in the Federal District 
Court for the Southern District of Florida in January of 2006, approximately 
one month after his AEDPA limitations deadline had passed.101  As Holland 
had exhausted his state court remedies, a federal habeas corpus petition was 
his last chance for judicial review of his conviction before his execution 
was to be carried out.  Holland asked the District Court to toll the 
limitations period on equitable grounds, claiming that his attorney’s 
egregious misconduct prevented him from filing his petition on time.102  
Eventually, Holland appealed his plea for equitable tolling to the Supreme 
Court.  For the first time in its jurisprudence, the Supreme Court handed 
down a ruling on the equitable tolling of AEDPA’s statute of limitations.   
In the year 2000, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed Holland’s 
conviction,103 and on October 1, 2001 the U.S. Supreme Court denied 
Holland’s petition for certiorari to review the State Court’s judgment.104  
On that date—the date that direct appellate review of Holland’s conviction 
became final—AEDPA’s one-year limitations period began to run.105  
Approximately one month later, the state of Florida appointed attorney 
Bradley Collins to represent Holland in all state and federal post-conviction 
matters.106  A full ten months after taking on Holland’s case, Collins filed a 
motion for post-conviction relief in a state trial court in September of 2002, 
316 days after his appointment as Holland’s attorney, and only 12 days 
before the one-year limitations period expired.107  That filing automatically 
stopped the running of the clock, as it triggered a statutory tolling provision 
for AEDPA’s limitations period.108  Although the limitations period was 
not running during Holland’s state post-conviction appeals process, Holland 
was left with only twelve days at that point.109   
Holland’s petition was pending in the various state courts over the next 
three years.110  During that time, Holland wrote Collins many letters 
requesting that Collins “make certain that all of his claims would be 
 
 100. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555. 
 101. Id. at 2554. 
 102. Id. at 2555. 
 103. Id. (citing Holland v. State, 773 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 2000)). 
 104. Id., cert. denied, 534 U.S. 834 (2001). 
 105. Id. at 2555. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (2006) (“The time during which a properly filed 
application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 
judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this 
subsection.”). 
 109. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555. 
 110. Id. 
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preserved for any subsequent federal habeas corpus review.”111  Collins 
wrote back to Holland, stating that “I would like to reassure you that we are 
aware of state-time limitations and federal exhaustion requirements” and 
instructed Holland that if his state post-conviction motion be denied, “your 
state habeas corpus claims will then be ripe for presentation in a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus in federal court.”112 
The state trial court denied Holland relief in 2003, and Collins appealed 
to the Florida Supreme Court.113  That is when Collins’s communication 
with his client began to break down.  Over the next three years, from April 
2003 to January 2006, Collins communicated with Holland only three 
times, each time by a letter sent to Holland’s prison.114  Holland became 
increasingly unhappy with his attorney’s lack of communication, and wrote 
the Florida Supreme Court on two separate occasions, asking it to remove 
Collins from his case.115  In the second letter, filed in 2004, Holland 
informed the court that “Collins had not kept [him] updated on the status of 
[his] capital case” and that Holland “had not seen or spoken to Collins since 
April 2003.”116  Holland also wrote that “Collins has abandoned [me]” and 
that “Collins has never made any reasonable effort to establish any 
relationship of trust or confidence with [me].”117  Holland concluded by 
asking the court to dismiss or remove Collins from his capital case.118  As 
the opposing party, the State filed a response to Holland’s request, arguing 
that Holland could not file any pro se paperwork with the court while he 
was represented by counsel—including any requests seeking new counsel 
for his case.119  The Florida Supreme Court agreed with the State and 
denied Holland’s request for a new attorney.120 
After being turned down by the court, Holland then wrote letters to the 
Clerk of the Florida Supreme Court asking for assistance in obtaining 
information about his case.121  Holland wrote, “I’m not trying to get on 
your nerves.  I just would like to know exactly what is happening with my 
case on appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida.”122  He added, “[I]f I had a 
competent . . . post-conviction, appellate attorney representing me, I would 
not have to write you this letter.”123  During that time, Holland also filed a 
complaint against Collins with the Florida Bar Association, but his 
complaint was denied.124  Holland then wrote again to the Florida Supreme 
Court Clerk requesting copies of the State’s response to his State Habeas 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 2556. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
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Corpus Petition.125  The Clerk responded to Holland’s letter by informing 
Holland that he would have to pay for the copies of his records by 
“submitt[ing] a check or money order in the amount of $77.00”126 or that 
“in lieu of sending money he could contact his attorney for copies or visit 
the Court’s webpage.”127  Holland was indigent, so he was not able to send 
money for the copies, and, as a death row inmate, he had no access to 
computers or the Internet, and thus could not visit the court’s webpage to 
obtain information about his case.128  Out of the choices the Clerk presented 
to him, the only route of communication Holland had available was through 
his attorney. 
Meanwhile, without informing Holland, Collins argued Holland’s appeal 
before the Florida Supreme Court in February of 2005.129  Holland, who 
had been in the dark about his case for over a year at this point, continued to 
write his attorney a series of letters “emphasizing the importance of filing a 
timely petition for habeas corpus in federal court once the Florida Supreme 
Court issued its ruling.”130  On March 3, 2005, Holland wrote: 
 Dear Mr. Collins, P.A.:  How are you?  Fine I hope.  I write this letter 
to ask that you please write me back, as soon as possible to let me know 
what the status of my case is on appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida.  
If the Florida Supreme Court denies my [post-conviction] and State 
Habeas Corpus appeals, please file my 28 U.S.C. 2254 writ of Habeas 
Corpus petition, before my deadline to file it runs out (expires).  Thank 
you very much.  Please have a nice day.131 
Collins did not answer this letter.132  Holland wrote again on June 15, 
2005: 
 Dear Mr. Collins:  How are you?  Fine I hope.  On March 3, 2005 I 
wrote you a letter, asking that you let me know the status of my case on 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida.  Also, have you begun preparing 
my 28 U.S.C. § 2254 writ of Habeas Corpus petition?  Please let me 
know, as soon as possible.  Thank you.133 
Again, Collins did not reply.134 
Five months later, in November 2005, the Florida Supreme Court 
affirmed the lower court decision denying Holland’s motion for post-
conviction relief.135  On December 1, 2005, the court’s decision became 
final when it issued its mandate.136  Once again the AEDPA clock began 
 
 125. Brief for Petitioner at 9–10, Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2459 (2010) (No. 09-
5327). 
 126. Id. at 11. 
 127. Id. at 12 n.12. 
 128. Id. at 2 n.1. 
 129. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2556. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. (citing Holland v. State, 916 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 2005) (per curiam)). 
 136. Id. (citing Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2008)). 
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ticking, with only twelve days left on the one-year time limit.137  Collins 
never informed his client about the court’s decision, and twelve days later 
Holland’s AEDPA time limit expired,138 and with it so did his last plea for 
judicial review of his conviction and death sentence:  his federal writ of 
habeas corpus. 
Holland, however, was still unaware of the Florida Supreme Court’s 
ruling and continued to write his attorney letters asking for information 
about his case.  In January of 2006, Holland wrote: 
  Dear Mr. Bradley M. Collins:  How are you?  Fine I hope.  I write this 
letter to ask that you please let me know the status of my appeals before 
the Supreme Court of Florida.  Have my appeals been decided yet?  
Please send me the [necessary information] . . . so that I can determine 
when the deadline will be to file my 28 U.S.C. Rule 2254 Federal Habeas 
Corpus Petition, in accordance with all United States Supreme Court and 
Eleventh Circuit case law and applicable ‘Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act,’ if my appeals before the Supreme Court of Florida are 
denied.  Please be advised that I want to preserve my privilege to federal 
review of all of my state convictions and sentences. 
  Mr. Collins, would you please also inform me as to which United States 
District Court my 28 U.S.C. Rule 2254 Federal Habeas Corpus Petition 
will have to be timely filed in and that court’s address?  Thank you very 
much.139 
Again, Collins did not answer.140  Nine days later, Holland, while 
working in the prison library, learned for the first time that the Florida 
Supreme Court had made a decision on his case five weeks ago.141  
Immediately, he wrote his own pro se federal habeas corpus petition and 
mailed it to the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Florida 
the next day.142  Holland then tried to call Collins from his prison, but he 
called collect and Collin’s office refused to accept the call.143 
Five days later, Collins wrote Holland a letter and told him that as 
Collins understood the AEDPA statue, Holland’s one-year limitations 
period had in fact expired in 2000, before Collins had even begun to 
represent Holland.144  Collins wrote: 
 Dear Mr. Holland:  I am in receipt of your letter . . . concerning 
operation of AEDPA time limitations.  One hurdle in our upcoming 
efforts to obtain federal habeas corpus relief will be that the one-year 
statutory time frame for filing such a petition began to run after [your] 
case was affirmed [by the Florida Supreme Court] on October 5, 2000 
. . . .  However, it was not until November 7, 2001, that I received the 
Order appointing me to the case.  As you can see, I was appointed about a 
 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 2557 (alteration in original). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. (citing Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2008)). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 2557–58. 
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year after your case became final . . . . [T]he AEPDA time period [thus] 
had run before my appointment and therefore before your [post-
conviction] motion was filed.145 
Collins’s interpretation of the law was wrong.146  Holland’s time clock 
had not begun to run until after the Supreme Court denied certiorari on 
October 1, 2001.147  Therefore, when Collins was appointed in November 
of 2001, the AEDPA clock still had 328 days remaining.148  Holland 
immediately wrote back to his attorney informing Collins of his error: 
 Dear Mr. Collins:  I received your letter . . . .  You are incorrect in 
stating that the one-year statutory time frame for filing my 2254 petition 
began to run after my case was affirmed on October 5, 2000, by the 
Florida Supreme Court. . . .  Also, Mr. Collins you never told me that my 
time ran out (expired).  I told you to timely file my 28 U.S.C. 2254 
Habeas Corpus Petition before the deadline, so that I would not be time-
barred.  You never informed me of oral arguments or of the Supreme 
Court of Florida’s November 10, 2005 decision denying my post-
conviction appeals. . . .  Mr. Collins, please file my 2254 Habeas Petition 
immediately.  Please do not wait any longer, even though it will be 
untimely filed at least it will be filed without wasting anymore [sic] time. 
(valuable time).149 
Once again, Collins did not answer this letter, nor did he file a federal 
habeas petition as his client requested.150 
In March of 2006, Holland filed another complaint with the Florida Bar 
Association.151  This time, the Bar demanded a response from Collins, 
which he provided through his own attorney.152  By that point, Holland had 
already filed another pro se petition in the District Court requesting for a 
second time that Collins be dismissed from his case.153  Once again, the 
State filed a response to Holland’s request and argued that “Holland could 
not file a pro se motion seeking to have Collins removed while he was 
represented by counsel, i.e., represented by Collins.”154 
Fortunately for Holland, this time the court considered Holland’s motion 
and allowed Collins to withdraw from the case.155  The court appointed a 
new lawyer for Holland and heard arguments as to whether the 
circumstances of Holland’s case justified the equitable tolling of AEDPA’s 
limitations period for the five weeks that Collins failed to inform his client 
about the Florida Supreme Court’s decision that triggered the clock 
 
 145. Id. at 2558. 
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again.156  If the court agreed to equitably toll the limitations period for those 
five weeks, Holland’s federal habeas corpus petition would be considered 
timely.157 
After considering the case, the Federal District Court held that Holland’s 
circumstances did not warrant equitable tolling and therefore his petition 
was time-barred.158  The court suggested that Holland “was a difficult 
client” and that “Collins’ professional conduct in the case was at worst 
merely negligent.”159  The court stated that “even if Collins’ behavior could 
be characterized as an extraordinary circumstance,” Holland had 
nonetheless failed to demonstrate the requisite “due diligence” aspect of the 
equitable tolling inquiry because he, among other things, did not seek aid 
from outside supporters.160 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the District Court in holding 
that Holland’s petition was untimely.161  However, it did not address the 
question of Holland’s diligence, but instead held that the facts of Holland’s 
case did not warrant equitable tolling because Holland had not met the 
second part of the inquiry—namely that some extraordinary circumstance 
stood in his way and prevented timely filing.162   Specifically, the Court of 
Appeals stated that Collins’s behavior involved “no more than [p]ure 
professional negligence” and that “such behavior [on the part of a 
petitioner’s attorney] can never constitute an extraordinary 
circumstance.”163 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari164 and heard arguments in March 
of 2010.165  The next section of this Comment examines the arguments of 
the various briefs submitted to the Court. 
B.  Arguments from the Briefs 
1.  Albert Holland 
In his brief, Holland argued that he had shown sufficient facts to prove he 
had been pursuing his rights diligently, and that an “extraordinary 
circumstance” stood in his way and prevented him from a timely filing— 
namely his attorney, Bradley Collins.166 
Holland first addressed the threshold issue of whether AEDPA’s statute 
of limitations was actually subject to equitable tolling.  Holland cited 
 
 156. Id. 
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 159. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 160. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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 162. Id. 
 163. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334, 
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 164. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 398 (2009). 
 165. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2549. 
 166. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 125, at 27. 
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Supreme Court precedent, noting that “[i]t is hornbook law that limitations 
periods are customarily subject to equitable tolling.”167  He argued that the 
writ of habeas corpus itself has historically been “governed by equitable 
principles”168 and that eleven of the federal appellate courts have held that 
AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling.169  Most importantly, Holland 
pointed to a rich history of case law stating that equitable remedies are 
warranted when the rigid application of a rule would “lead to unacceptably 
unjust outcomes.”170  Holland next turned his attention to the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision and argued that application of its rigid, bright-line rule 
regarding an attorney’s conduct would lead to an unjust outcome in his 
case. 
In its decision, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that even if Collins’s conduct 
was grossly negligent, 
[N]o allegation of lawyer negligence . . . in the absence of an allegation 
and proof of bad faith, dishonesty, divided loyalty, mental impairment or 
so forth on the lawyer’s part–can rise to the level of egregious attorney 
misconduct that would entitle Petitioner to equitable tolling.  Pure 
professional negligence is not enough.171 
Holland argued that if the Eleventh Circuit’s rule prevailed, many cases 
such as his, in which “a perfect storm of circumstances resulted in the 
AEDPA statute of limitations not being met,” would never “receive 
meaningful, equitable consideration” by the courts.172  With the goal of 
equitable treatment in mind, Holland then presented his arguments for 
equitable tolling in his particular case.  He noted that not only had he 
written numerous letters to his attorney, but when his attorney did not 
respond he asked for assistance from the Clerk of the Florida Supreme 
Court and the Florida Bar Association on multiple occasions.173  Despite 
Collins’s recurring failure to communicate with his client, Holland 
continued to write him letters, and even outlined—and correctly 
interpreted—the relevant sections of the United States Code pertaining to 
Federal Habeas Corpus time limitations.174  Furthermore, every time 
Holland tried to speak on his own behalf to alert the state court of his 
attorney’s behavior, the “State successfully muzzled him” by arguing that 
Holland could not proceed pro se while he was represented by an 
attorney.175  Holland’s inability to speak on his own behalf to preserve his 
federal rights, and his attorney’s absence and thus inability to speak for 
 
 167. Id. at 36 n.31 (quoting Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49 (2002)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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him, constituted “extraordinary circumstance[s]” that prevented him from 
filing a timely petition.176 
Holland also argued that his “diligence was far more than reasonably can 
be expected of someone in his situation.”177  He noted that the “due 
diligence” requirement should be “construed in light of a habeas petitioner’s 
confinement in prison and any special restrictions that incarceration might 
impose on such a person.”178  Holland had repeatedly alerted the Florida 
Supreme Court, the State, and the Bar Association that he wanted to 
preserve his federal rights and that he feared his attorney had abandoned 
him.179  Despite his efforts, Holland continued, he was not able to assert his 
rights because the State and the court told Holland he could not speak on 
his own behalf;180 the Clerk twice referred him to the court’s webpage, 
despite the fact that death row prisoners are not allowed to use 
computers;181 and the Florida Bar Association ignored his first 
complaint.182  When his attorney finally did contact him, his attorney was 
wrong about the law and gave him incorrect advice.183  Holland nonetheless 
wrote again to his attorney, providing him with the correct interpretation of 
the law, despite the fact that Holland’s access to the prison law library and 
writ room was substantially constrained by prison regulations.184  Holland 
concluded by stating that at no point in his case did he sit on his rights.  To 
the contrary, he filed a pro se petition the very next day after he first learned 
of the Florida Supreme Court’s decision.185  The fact that he was not 
successful in meeting his AEDPA deadline, he asserted, did not mean he 
was not diligent.186  For all his diligence in the face of such extraordinary 
circumstances, Holland concluded that he had met the threshold required 
for equitable tolling.187 
2.  Florida 
The State of Florida argued that AEDPA was not subject to equitable 
tolling, and that even if it were, Holland’s case did not warrant such 
treatment.  It went even further by contending that the Eleventh Circuit’s 
ruling was too broad because attorney misconduct, whatever the attorney’s 
level of culpability, should never be a reason to grant a prisoner equitable 
 
 176. Id. at 58. 
 177. Id. at 59. 
 178. Id. at 59–60. 
 179. Id. at 60. 
 180. Id. at 57–58. 
 181. Id. at 12 n.12, 14. 
 182. Id. at 8 n.8 (noting that “[t]he Florida Bar did not initiate an investigation and did not 
request that Collins respond [to the complaint against him]”). 
 183. Id. at 19. 
 184. Id. at 21–22 (noting that “the prison limits the hours that [Holland] may have access 
to the law library and the law materials contained there are very limited”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 185. Id. at 55; see also Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2557 (2010). 
 186. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 125, at 60 n.58. 
 187. Id. at 27. 
2010] ATTORNEY ERROR & AEDPA 1455 
tolling.188  In support for its argument, the State cited the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Coleman v. Thompson.189  In Coleman, the Court held that an 
attorney’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal in a collateral proceeding 
was not a reason to excuse a procedural default specifically because “no 
constitutional right to post-conviction counsel exists.”190  Under agency 
principles, the State continued, an attorney is his client’s agent and 
therefore clients are required to bear the risk of an attorney missing a 
deadline.191  Further, the State averred, the Court in Coleman specifically 
rejected the “assertion that a post-conviction attorney’s error can be ‘so bad 
that the lawyer ceases to be an agent of the petitioner.’”192 
The State further contended that mistakes or negligence by a litigant’s 
attorney are “grounded in circumstances” within the litigant’s control, and 
thus do not qualify as “extraordinary circumstances” that are beyond the 
petitioner’s control for equitable tolling purposes.193  Moreover, the State 
framed Holland’s challenges with his attorney as nothing more than his 
attorney’s “misunderstanding of the law [regarding] when the one-year 
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about whether he was entitled to equitable tolling under the circumstances of his late habeas 
corpus filing. Id. at 10. 
 193. Brief for Respondent, supra note 188, at 39. 
1456 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
limitations period under AEDPA began to run.”194  The State then cited 
Lawrence v. Florida,195 in which the Court held that “[a]ttorney 
miscalculation [of AEDPA’s limitations period] is simply not sufficient to 
warrant equitable tolling.”196  “Viewed fairly,” the State concluded, “the 
relationship between Holland and Collins was one in which Holland 
consistently second-guessed and interfered with the professional judgment 
of his counsel”197 and thus “Holland’s claim for equitable tolling reduces to 
a misunderstanding about the tolling period for the federal habeas 
petition.”198  Accordingly, none of Holland’s claims rise to the level of 
“extraordinary attorney behavior” that could justify equitable tolling under 
the Lawrence precedent.199 
Although the State insisted that the Eleventh Circuit’s decision should be 
affirmed, it also argued that its standard for allowing equitable tolling only 
in cases of an attorney’s egregious misconduct “is unworkable in 
practice.”200  The Eleventh Circuit’s rule, the State warned, creates 
incentives for prisoners to falsely allege that their attorneys acted with 
dishonesty as a delay tactic to prolong their limitations periods.201  Indeed, 
capital litigants and their attorneys may even have “some incentive to agree 
that counsel . . . [was] less than honest if the effect is to extend the time for 
judgment and avoid finality.”202  The State further cautioned that the 
Eleventh Circuit’s standards of “divided loyalty and mental impairment” 
are similarly subjective and create the same incentive for prisoners to 
characterize circumstances within their control as “extraordinary” for the 
purposes of obtaining equitable tolling.203 
The State then turned its attention to the due diligence prong of the 
equitable tolling analysis and supported the District Court’s findings that 
Holland had not acted with the requisite level of diligence under the 
 
 194. Id. at 43. 
 195. 549 U.S. 327 (2007). 
 196. Id. at 336–37. 
 197. Brief for Respondent, supra note 188, at 45. 
 198. Id. at 43.  In Petitioner’s Reply Brief, Holland argued that there is a difference 
between an attorney’s simple negligence in failing to file a petition and a situation in which 
an attorney ignores his client’s requests or instructions.  See Petitioner’s Reply Brief, supra 
note 192, at 11–14.  Holland cited Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), in which the 
Court held that a lawyer who disregards specific instructions from a client to file a notice of 
appeal “acts in a manner that is professionally unreasonable. . . . [F]iling a notice of appeal is 
purely a ministerial task, and the failure to file reflects inattention to the defendant’s wishes.” 
Id. at 477 (citations omitted).  Holland thus argued that his circumstances were 
distinguishable from mere attorney negligence because Holland had repeatedly instructed his 
attorney to file his federal habeas petition on time.  See Petitioner’s Reply Brief, supra note 
192, at 13. 
 199. Brief for Respondent, supra note 188, at 44 (adding that “[t]his ‘garden variety’ 
negligence by an attorney does not provide grounds for equitable tolling”) (citing Holland v. 
Florida, 539 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2008)). 
 200. Id. at 46–50. 
 201. Id. at 46–47. 
 202. Id. at 47. 
 203. Id. at 49. 
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circumstances.204  As the District Court held, when “Holland felt his 
attorney was not competent, it became incumbent upon Holland to act given 
the circumstances he found himself in” and that “a reasonable person in his 
position would have done more to protect his interests in filing a federal 
habeas petition.”205 
C.  The Holland Decision 
In a seven-to-two decision, the Supreme Court decided that AEDPA’s 
statute of limitations was subject to equitable tolling.206  The Court also 
overturned the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling that Holland’s case did not warrant 
equitable intervention, as well as its bright-line rule for equitable tolling in 
cases of attorney default.207  While the Court stated that the facts of 
Holland’s situation “suggest that this case may well present ‘extraordinary’ 
circumstances,” the Court did not make a determination as to whether 
Holland was entitled to equitable tolling.208  Instead, it remanded his case to 
the Eleventh Circuit for further proceedings to determine whether equitable 
tolling was warranted under the Court’s new guidelines.209 
The Court began its analysis by holding that AEDPA is subject to 
equitable tolling, reiterating its precedent that a non-jurisdictional federal 
statute of limitations is subject to a rebuttable presumption in favor of 
equitable tolling.210  This presumption, the Court stated, was further 
reinforced by the fact that habeas corpus has always been an equitable 
remedy governed by equitable principles.211  The Court concluded that 
although AEDPA was enacted with the purpose of eliminating delays in the 
process of federal habeas review, the statute can still achieve its purpose 
without undermining the basic equitable principles of habeas corpus, under 
which a petition’s timeliness had historically been determined by equitable 
standards.212  Accordingly, the Court concluded that AEDPA’s limitations 
period is subject to equitable tolling.213 
 
 204. Id. at 45–46. 
 205. Id. at 46 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The State, however, did not provide any 
explanation as to what actions, in its opinion, Holland could have taken that would have 
fulfilled the diligence requirement. 
 206. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2554 (2010).  Justice Breyer delivered the 
opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Stevens, Kennedy, 
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor joined.  Justice Alito concurred in the judgment and filed a 
concurring opinion.  Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas 
joined as to all but Part I. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 2565. 
 209. Id.  
 210. Id. at 2560 (citing Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990)). 
 211. Id. (“‘[E]quitable principles’ have traditionally ‘governed’ the substantive law of 
habeas corpus’” (quoting Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008))). 
 212. Id. at 2562. 
 213. Id.  As this Comment is focused on attorney default rather than the general question 
of whether AEDPA’s limitations period should be subject to equitable tolling, this Comment 
briefly discusses the Court’s reasoning behind its decision in this regard.  For further 
discussion of this issue, see id. at 2560–63.  See also Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 125, 
at 36–45; Brief for the Respondent, supra note 188, at 22–31. See generally Bellamy, supra 
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Turning to the issue of attorney default, the Court reversed the Eleventh 
Circuit’s ruling and remanded Holland’s case to determine whether the 
factual allegations in the record actually warrant equitable tolling.214  The 
Court set the stage for the equitable tolling inquiry by invoking the canons 
of professional responsibility as a benchmark for evaluating whether the 
attorney’s behavior rose to the level of extraordinary circumstances that 
prevented Holland from filing his habeas petition on time.215  The Court 
found that Collins’s failures to perform adequate legal research or 
communicate with his client about crucial facts such as the Florida Supreme 
Court’s decision—which triggered AEDPA’s limitations period again—
were actions that violated basic standards of professional responsibility.216  
In this case, the Court concluded, Collins’s professional lapses extinguished 
his client’s ability to assert his last appeal for judicial review before his 
conviction and death sentence was to be carried out.217  The Court thus 
found that Collins had violated fundamental principles of professional 
conduct, and that Holland was seriously prejudiced by his attorney’s 
failures in this regard.  Having found that Holland was injured by his 
attorney’s conduct, the Court then had to make a decision:  It could either 
strictly apply agency law, which binds clients to the acts or omissions of 
their attorneys, or carve out an exception to the agency doctrine by invoking 
equitable principles and granting Holland the remedy of equitable tolling.218 
In the beginning of its agency analysis, the Court recognized its previous 
holdings in the context of procedural default in which petitioners “must 
‘bear the risk of attorney error.’”219  While the Court has historically 
disposed of claims of attorney error resulting in procedural default by 
applying agency law, the Court continued, equity has also played an 
integral role in the Court’s jurisprudence, and it emphasized the need for 
flexibility to avoid injustices that may occur when a law is strictly 
applied.220  In light of both of these precedents—agency and equity—equity 
carried the day in Holland’s case, and the Court held that professional 
 
note 42, at 54 (contending that equitable tolling should be applied to AEDPA’s limitations 
period in order to avoid unjust outcomes); Traum, supra note 38, at 599 (arguing that 
equitable tolling is necessary to ensure prisoners are not unfairly deprived of access to 
habeas relief). 
 214. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564–65. 
 215. Id. at 2562 (“In this case, the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ at issue involve an 
attorney’s failure to satisfy professional standards of care.”). 
 216. Id. at 2565.  Specifically, the Court commented that Collins’s behavior violated 
ethical rules that require attorneys to perform “reasonably competent legal work, to 
communicate with their clients, [and] to keep their clients informed of key developments in 
their cases.” Id. at 2564. 
 217. Id. at 2565 (noting that his attorney’s failures extinguished “his single opportunity 
for federal habeas review of the lawfulness of his imprisonment and of his death sentence”). 
 218. Id. at 2563 (noting that “this case asks how equity should be applied”). 
 219. Id. (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752–53 (1991)).  This notion is 
consistent with the fundamental principles of agency law. 
 220. Id. (“[W]e have followed a tradition in which courts of equity have sought to ‘relieve 
hardships which, from time to time, arise from a hard and fast adherence’ to more absolute 
legal rules . . . .”) (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 
248 (1944)). 
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misconduct that amounts to egregious attorney behavior can constitute an 
extraordinary circumstance warranting the use of equitable tolling.221 
However, the Court limited its ruling by reaffirming its longstanding rule 
that an attorney’s simple negligence is not an extraordinary circumstance, 
thus it does not warrant equitable tolling.222  In distinguishing negligence 
from misconduct, the Court described attorneys who miscalculate the 
statute of limitations deadline as examples of “garden variety claim[s] of 
excusable neglect.”223  It labeled Holland’s attorney’s conduct, on the other 
hand, as a case of “far more serious instances of attorney misconduct.”224  
However, the Court did not specifically define misconduct, rather, it simply 
held that behavior that falls into the category of attorney misconduct is “not 
limited to those [circumstances] that satisfy the test the Court of Appeals 
used in this case.”225 
Finally, the Court turned to the issue of due diligence, and held that 
Holland had acted with the requisite level of diligence to satisfy this prong 
of the equitable tolling analysis.226  The standard required for equitable 
tolling, the Court continued, was “reasonable diligence” and not “maximum 
feasible diligence.”227  In making its determination, the Court emphasized 
that Holland immediately took action when he found out his attorney had 
failed to file his habeas petition on time by filing his pro se petition the next 
day.228   
Upon remand, the Eleventh Circuit handed Holland’s case back to the 
District Court for-fact finding and further proceedings consistent with the 
 
 221. Id.  In supporting its holding, the Court finally decided the circuit split by citing the 
line of circuit court cases that held attorney misconduct could warrant equitable tolling. See 
id. at 2563–64 (noting that “[s]everal lower courts have specifically held that unprofessional 
attorney conduct may, in certain circumstances, prove ‘egregious’ and can be 
‘extraordinary’”).  The Court also distinguished its prior ruling in Coleman simply by stating 
that “Coleman was a ‘case about federalism’” because its inquiry turned on whether federal 
courts may excuse a litigant’s failure to comply with a state court’s procedural rules. Id. at 
2563.  The equitable tolling question in this case, the Court continued, asked only whether 
federal courts may excuse a litigant’s failure to comply with federal procedural rules—an 
inquiry that does not implicate federalism concerns. Id. 
 222. Id. at 2564.  By excluding negligence from circumstances that may warrant equitable 
tolling, the Court avoided any contradiction with its ruling in Lawrence, in which it held that 
attorney negligence did not warrant equitable tolling in Lawrence’s case, but did not evaluate 
any issues of attorney misconduct. See Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336–37 (2007). 
 223. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id.  Here, the Court referred to the Eleventh Circuit’s test to determine where to 
draw the line between attorney negligence or misconduct, which stated that “attorney 
negligence that is ‘grossly negligent’ can never warrant equitable tolling absent ‘bad faith, 
dishonesty, divided loyalty, mental impairment or so forth on the lawyer’s part.” Id. at 2562–
63 (quoting Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)). 
 226. Id. at 2565. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. (noting that “the very day Holland discovered that his AEDPA clock had expired 
due to Collins’ failings, Holland prepared his own habeas petition pro se and promptly filed 
it with the District Court”). 
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Supreme Court’s judgment.229  As of the publication of this Comment, 
Holland’s case is still pending in the District Court. 
D.  The Concurrence 
Justice Alito wrote a concurring opinion in which he agreed with the 
majority that the facts of Holland’s case suggest that his attorney’s conduct 
was so far beyond ordinary negligence that equitable tolling would likely be 
awarded in this case upon remand.230  Justice Alito wrote separately, 
however, because he thought the majority opinion did not provide sufficient 
guidance for the lower courts.231  While he acknowledged the impracticality 
of attempting to anticipate and define every situation in which an attorney’s 
behavior could be construed as negligence or misconduct, he set forth 
“several broad principles” about the negligence/misconduct distinction to 
guide the lower courts in their future cases.232  First, Justice Alito explained 
that it would be impractical for courts to attempt to distinguish “ordinary” 
attorney negligence from gross negligence,233 therefore, any form of 
attorney negligence should never constitute equitable tolling and instead 
must always be attributed to the client under agency principles.234  Since 
the attorney is acting on behalf of the client in furtherance of the litigation, 
he explained, the attorney’s negligence is constructively attributed to the 
client.235  Therefore, he concluded, the attorney’s negligence is not a 
circumstance beyond the prisoner’s control that would prevent him from 
filing his habeas petition on time.236 
Justice Alito argued that attorney misconduct, on the other hand, would 
be grounds for equitable tolling of AEDPA’s limitations period because an 
agent’s misconduct is not constructively attributable to the client.237  In this 
aspect of his opinion, he cited the Second Circuit’s agency analysis in 
stating that when an attorney’s actions are completely adverse to the client’s 
interests, the attorney is not truly acting as the client’s agent and therefore 
his actions are not constructively attributed to the client.238  This rule 
 
 229. See Holland v. Florida, No. 07-13366, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 16058, at *1 (11th 
Cir. Aug. 3, 2010) (ordering the District Court to hold an evidentiary hearing if necessary). 
 230. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2566 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that Holland “alleged 
certain facts that go well beyond any form of attorney negligence”). 
 231. Id. (“Although I agree that the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard, I think 
that the majority does not do enough to explain the right standard.”). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 2567 (arguing that the question of equitable tolling should not “turn on the 
highly artificial distinction between gross and ordinary negligence”). 
 234. Id. at 2566 (noting that the Court’s prior cases of procedural default make the law 
“abundantly clear that attorney negligence is not an extraordinary circumstance warranting 
equitable tolling”). 
 235. Id. at 2566–67 (explaining that “[a]ttorney ignorance or inadvertence is not ‘cause’ 
[for excusing a procedural default] because the attorney is the petitioner’s agent when acting, 
or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation, and the petitioner ‘must bear the risk of  
attorney error’” (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991))). 
 236. Id. at 2567. 
 237. Id. at 2568. 
 238. Id. (“[W]hen an ‘agent acts in a manner completely adverse to the principal’s 
interests,’ the ‘principal is not charged with [the] agent’s misdeeds.’” (alteration in original) 
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separating attorney negligence from misconduct, Alito reasoned, was in full 
conformity with agency law.  Further, he remarked, “[c]ommon sense 
dictates that a litigant cannot be held constructively responsible for the 
conduct of an attorney who is not operating as his agent in any meaningful 
sense of that word.”239  If Holland’s allegations of his attorney’s conduct 
prove to be true, Justice Alito concluded, they would establish the 
extraordinary circumstances beyond his control that warrant equitable 
tolling.240 
E.  The Dissent 
Justices Scalia and Thomas did not agree with either aspect of the 
majority’s ruling.  The dissent stated its opinion that AEDPA’s limitations 
period should not be subject to equitable tolling, and Holland would not be 
eligible for such a remedy even if it were.241  In the plain language of the 
statute, the dissent emphasized, Congress had enumerated specific events 
that toll the limitations period, leaving no room for the Court to add 
exceptions, such as equitable tolling, as it sees fit.242 
The dissent then turned to the facts of Holland’s case and firmly adhered 
to the principles of agency law in its determination that Holland’s 
circumstances did not warrant equitable tolling.243  The dissent explained 
that Congress could have included errors made by state-appointed habeas 
counsel as a statutory basis for tolling the limitations period, but it did 
not.244  Therefore, the dissent concluded, “when a state habeas petitioner’s 
appeal is filed too late because of attorney error, the petitioner is out of 
luck.”245 
For support, the dissent pointed to the Court’s recent decisions in 
Coleman and Lawrence.  Coleman, the dissent stated, was not a case about 
federalism as the majority proclaimed.246  Instead, Coleman merely 
reinforced the principle that because there is no Sixth Amendment right to 
the effective assistance of counsel in habeas proceedings, “the rule holding 
[the petitioner] responsible for his attorney’s acts applies with full force” in 
this case.247  The dissent also reasoned that Lawrence was squarely on point 
with the facts of Holland’s case.248  Collins, the dissent proceeded, most 
 
(quoting Baldayaque v. United States, 338 F.3d 145, 154 (2d Cir. 2003) (Jacobs, J., 
concurring))). 
 239. Id. (emphasizing that petitioners should not be held accountable for an attorney’s 
misconduct especially when “the litigant’s reasonable efforts to terminate the attorney’s 
representation have been thwarted by forces wholly beyond the petitioner’s control”). 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 2569 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 242. Id. at 2570.  For further discussion of the dissent’s interpretation of AEDPA’s 
limitations period, which Justice Thomas did not join, see id. at 2569–71. 
 243. Id. at 2571 (“Because the attorney is the litigant’s agent, the attorney’s acts (or 
failures to act) within the scope of the representation are treated as those of his client . . . .”). 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 2571 n.4. 
 247. Id. at 2571 (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752–54 (1991)). 
 248. Id. at 2572. 
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likely made the exact mistake that the attorney in Lawrence made by 
assuming incorrectly that a pending petition for certiorari in the Supreme 
Court seeking review of the state court’s denial of post-conviction relief 
would toll AEDPA’s timing provisions under § 2244(d)(2).249  Although 
this mistake would account for Collins’s conduct, the dissent persisted, it 
would be insufficient to warrant equitable tolling under Lawrence.250 
Justice Scalia then addressed the due diligence standard of the equitable 
tolling analysis.  In the dissent’s opinion, nothing Collins did actually 
prevented Holland from filing his habeas petition on time.251  Collins’s 
repeated failures to respond to Holland’s requests for information, Justice 
Scalia continued, should have alerted Holland that “Collins had fallen 
asleep at the switch.”252  Accordingly, the dissent admonished, Holland 
could have filed a “‘protective’ federal habeas application” and asked the 
federal court to stay its proceedings until the state courts finished their 
review.253  He could have also checked the prison writ room for his court 
records on a more regular basis.254  In short, the dissent argued that Holland 
could have taken many other actions to file his habeas petition on time and 
therefore was not convinced that Holland had acted with the requisite 
diligence required for equitable tolling.255 
Finally, the dissent expressed concern over the precedential and policy 
ramifications of the majority’s opinion.  First, the dissent stated that the 
majority’s holding created a disincentive for states to provide post-
conviction counsel at all, as “[i]t would be utterly perverse . . . to penalize 
the State for providing habeas petitioners with representation, when the 
 
 249. Id. The defaulting attorney in Lawrence had made this exact mistake in calculating 
AEDPA’s limitations period. See Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 330–36 (2007).  In 
Lawrence, the Court first noted that the text of AEDPA’s limitations period provided for 
statutory tolling only while state courts reviewed a habeas petition. Id. at 332.  The Supreme 
Court, however, “is not a part of a State’s post-conviction procedures” and therefore section 
2244(d)(2) of AEDPA’s limitations period is not tolled during the pendency of a petition for 
certiorari. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  While Collins did not seem to be aware of 
the rule in Lawrence, Holland apparently was, and brought this issue to Collins’s attention in 
one of the many letters he wrote to his attorney. See Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2557 (“Dear Mr. 
Bradley M. Collins:  . . . .  It’s my understanding that the AEDPA time limitations is not 
tolled during discretionary appellate reviews, such as certiorari applications resulting from 
denial of state post conviction proceedings.”). 
 250. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2572 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 251. Id. at 2573.  This aspect of the dissent’s analysis is on par with the Seventh Circuit, 
which before Holland had consistently held that diligent prisoners could always file their 
own pro se petitions in federal court if they were worried that their attorneys were going to 
miss the deadline. See, e.g., Powell v. Davis, 415 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
an attorney’s misconduct in abandoning the prisoner’s case for over a year did not actually 
prevent the prisoner from filing a timely petition); Modrowski v. Mote, 322 F.3d 965, 968 
(7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that attorney misconduct does not prevent a prisoner from filing 
his own pro se habeas petition because “petitioners bear ultimate responsibility for their 
filings, even if that means preparing duplicative petitions”). 
 252. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2573 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 253. Id. at 2576. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 2575. 
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State could avoid equitable tolling by providing none at all.”256  Second, the 
dissent lamented, the majority failed to adequately explain the errors in the 
Eleventh Circuit’s test and at the same time offered the lower courts little 
guidance as to what test they should actually use.257 
III.  QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE HOLLAND DECISION 
In Holland, the Supreme Court finally determined that AEDPA’s statute 
of limitations is subject to equitable tolling, and that in some circumstances, 
an attorney’s failure to file a habeas corpus petition on behalf of a prisoner 
may warrant the use of equitable tolling to allow the prisoner’s petition to 
be heard on the merits.  Because the Supreme Court’s decision in Holland 
is relatively recent, its long-term impact is hard to determine at this point.  
However, many commentators would likely applaud the first part of the 
Court’s decision that AEDPA’s limitations period is subject to equitable 
tolling.258  The focus of this Comment, however, is directed toward the 
second part of the Court’s ruling:  that an attorney’s negligence will never 
constitute such “extraordinary circumstances” to justify the use of equitable 
tolling, but that some situations involving attorney misconduct may.259  
While the Court’s decision to strike down the Eleventh Circuit’s overly 
narrow equitable tolling standard is commendable, this Comment argues 
that the Court incorrectly applied agency law to the context of post-
conviction habeas corpus representation and therefore did not go far enough 
to protect a prisoner’s access to his final appeal in the criminal justice 
system:  the writ of habeas corpus. 
A.  The New Rule for Equitable Tolling After Holland:  How the 
Negligence/Misconduct Standard is Unworkable in Practice 
As discussed above, the Court affirmed the equitable tolling rule it had 
previously referred to in Lawrence, which states that a prisoner may be 
granted equitable tolling if he can show “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his 
rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his 
way’ and prevented timely filing.”260  This section of the Comment takes a 
 
 256. Id. at 2571 n.5. 
 257. Id. at 2574.  Justice Scalia then proceeded to attack the majority’s reliance on 
attorney ethics rules in his usual rhetorical fashion:  “The only thing the Court offers that 
approaches substantive instruction is its implicit approval of ‘fundamental canons of 
professional responsibility,’ articulated by an ad hoc group of legal-ethicist amici consisting 
mainly of professors of that least analytically rigorous and hence most subjective of law-
school subjects, legal ethics.” Id. at 2575. 
 258. See, e.g., Bellamy, supra note 42, at 54 (supporting the use of equitable tolling in 
AEDPA litigation in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice); Stevenson, supra note 24, at 
360 (arguing that the denial of habeas corpus review on procedural grounds, such as the 
failure to file before the limitations period, is unfair); Traum, supra note 38, at 599 
(“[E]quitable tolling is essential to ensuring that the Court, in applying Section 2244(d) 
[AEDPA’s limitations period], does not unfairly deprive prisoners of access to the writ.”). 
 259. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564. 
 260. Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)); see also supra 
Part I.B. 
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closer look at the Court’s rule, specifically the range of attorney behaviors 
that constitute “extraordinary circumstances” and the actions the prisoner 
must take to meet the “due diligence” threshold. 
1.  Extraordinary Circumstances:  Why are Attorneys Ordinarily Negligent? 
As the Court noted in Holland, and the circuit courts of appeals found in 
similar cases of attorney default in AEDPA litigation, the extraordinary 
circumstances aspect of the equitable tolling rule requires courts to 
scrutinize the attorney’s conduct in failing to file a timely habeas petition 
on behalf of his client.261  Specifically, the Court held that simple attorney 
negligence does not constitute “extraordinary circumstances,”262 but that in 
some situations, professional misconduct that amounts to egregious attorney 
behavior does.263  Holland is not the first time that the Supreme Court has 
held that attorney negligence does not warrant equitable relief for the 
injured client, and has alluded several times to the notion that attorney 
negligence seems to be an ordinary occurrence within the legal 
profession.264 
The Court’s ruling that attorney negligence is not an “extraordinary 
circumstance” is unsettling for many reasons.  Why does the Supreme 
Court seem to be complacent with the notion that attorney negligence is an 
ordinary occurrence within the legal profession?  The legal profession is 
self regulated and has established attorney disciplinary mechanisms 
available to deter unprofessional conduct,265 but the Court did not once 
refer to these mechanisms or offer the lower courts any guidance as to how 
to craft rules that will improve the baseline standard of attorney behavior.  
Substandard criminal defense representation, at any stage of the litigation, 
undermines the adversarial process266 and engenders a negative public 
perception of the criminal justice system.267  Aside from the societal costs, 
 
 261. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2562. 
 262. Id. at 2564 (noting that an attorney’s “‘garden variety claim of excusable 
neglect’ . . . does not warrant equitable tolling” (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 
498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990))). 
 263. Id. at 2563 (noting that “professional misconduct that . . . amount[s] to egregious 
behavior [may] create an extraordinary circumstance that warrants equitable tolling”). 
 264. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336–37 (2007) (declining to allow 
equitable tolling for attorney mistake because it would then “essentially equitably toll 
limitations periods for every person whose attorney missed a deadline”); Irwin, 498 U.S. at 
96 (describing an attorney’s failure to submit a timely employment discrimination claim as a 
“garden variety claim” of an attorney’s excusable neglect); see also Modrowski v. Mote, 322 
F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that “attorney negligence is not extraordinary”).  
 265. Every jurisdiction maintains a disciplinary system that regulates lawyers according 
to codified ethical rules, and a license to practice law is conditioned upon compliance with 
the jurisdiction’s standards of professional conduct. See Curtis & Resnik, supra note 26, at 
1615–16. 
 266. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (holding that ineffective 
criminal defense representation undermines the “proper functioning of the adversarial 
process”). 
 267. See Curtis & Resnik, supra note 26, at 1628 (lamenting that “[p]oor provision of 
criminal defense services is a grievous injury not only for clients but for the legal profession 
and the public”); see also Stevenson, supra note 24, at 342 (“If the administration of 
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an ABA report commented that to the wrongfully convicted, “the cost of 
inadequate defense representation is reflected in countless wasted years 
spent in prison, the deprivation of cherished rights . . . and quite possibly 
the loss of life.”268  When an attorney miscalculates his client’s AEDPA 
deadline or engages in similar negligent conduct, the prisoner’s right to 
habeas corpus is extinguished, a situation which may engender the very 
consequences that the ABA predicts.  Thus, the Court has a strong policy 
incentive to deter attorney negligence in this context, and it is unfortunate 
for the wrongfully convicted prisoner—not to mention the ideals of fairness 
and justice—that the Court chose not to do so in its opinion in Holland. 
Furthermore, the Court’s distinction between negligence and misconduct 
seems to be unworkable in practice because it may lead to disparate results 
for prisoners who have pending cases in the circuit courts of appeals.  
While the Court stated definitively that ordinary attorney negligence does 
not warrant equitable tolling, it did not actually articulate a definable 
standard as to what types of attorney behavior would rise to the level of 
extraordinary circumstances.  For example, the Court overruled the 
Eleventh Circuit’s test, which required a prisoner to offer “proof of bad 
faith, dishonesty, divided loyalty, mental impairment or so forth” in order to 
be granted equitable tolling after his attorney missed the AEDPA 
deadline.269  However, the Court did not offer a test of its own, but instead 
merely stated, “we hold that such [extraordinary] circumstances are not 
limited to those that satisfy the test the Court of Appeals used in this 
case.”270  In his dissent, Justice Scalia emphasized this point when he stated 
that “the Court offers almost no clue about what test [the Eleventh Circuit] 
should have applied”271 and Justice Alito stated that “Although I agree that 
the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard, I think that the majority 
does not do enough to explain the right standard.” 272 
Commendably, the Court did at least suggest that lower courts use the 
canons of professional responsibility as a benchmark for determining 
whether the attorney’s behavior amounted to misconduct.273  Indeed, the 
 
criminal justice is perceived to be unfair, corrupt, biased, and error-plagued, it is not seen as 
a corrective or necessary component of public safety.”). 
 268. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 4.  The Third Circuit’s jurisprudence 
in AEDPA litigation reflected similar sentiments prior to Holland by affording considerable 
weight to the fact that there may be a death sentence on the line when deciding whether to 
bind a habeas petitioner by his attorney’s error. See Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 
2001) (recognizing that in capital cases, “the consequences of error are terminal, and we 
therefore pay particular attention to whether principles of ‘equity would make the rigid 
application of a limitation period unfair’”) (quoting Miller v. N.J. State Dep’t of Corr., 145 
F.3d 616, 618 (1998)). 
 269. Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334, 1339 (2008) (per curiam). 
 270. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2564 (2010). 
 271. Id. at 2574 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 272. Id. at 2566 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 273. Id. at 2564–65 (majority opinion).  Justice Scalia also acknowledged this point in his 
dissent, stating that “[t]he only thing the Court offers that approaches substantive instruction 
is its implicit approval of ‘fundamental canons of professional responsibility.’” Id. at 2574 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Court remarked that in Holland’s case, “the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ 
at issue involve an attorney’s failure to satisfy professional standards of 
care.”274  The Court then cited an attorney’s duties to, among other things, 
“communicate with their clients” and “perform reasonably competent legal 
work.”275  Although such standards of professional conduct are important, 
requiring the lower courts to use these standards to bisect the line between 
negligence and misconduct—which determines whether a prisoner’s habeas 
claim will be heard on the merits or not—may still very likely lead to 
disparate conclusions by the lower courts.   
For example, before Holland the Third and Seventh Circuits reached 
opposite conclusions in two cases that presented a similar set of facts:  
Modrowski v. Mote276 and Nara v. Frank.277  The attorneys in each case 
failed to meet AEDPA’s limitations deadline, failed to effectively 
communicate with their clients, and performed almost no legal work on 
their clients’ respective habeas petitions during the year in which the 
limitations period lapsed.278  Although both attorneys displayed similar 
behavior in effectively abandoning their clients, the Third Circuit found that 
this behavior amounted to attorney misconduct,279 while the Seventh 
Circuit held that it was merely attorney negligence.280  Nara, the prisoner in 
the Third Circuit, was awarded equitable tolling and had his habeas petition 
heard on the merits,281 while the unlucky prisoner in the Seventh Circuit, 
Modrowski, was not.282  These results have real consequences.  When all 
was said and done, Nara’s habeas corpus petition was ultimately granted.  
After the Third Circuit heard his claims on the merits, it found that he had 
in fact been wrongfully convicted.283  What might have come of 
Modrowski’s habeas claims, no one will ever know, since his attorney filed 
the petition one day late.  
 
 274. Id. at 2562 (majority opinion). 
 275. Id. at 2564. See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2003) (requiring a 
lawyer to “act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client”); Id. R. 
1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to “keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the 
matter”). 
 276. 322 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 277. 264 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 278. See Modrowski, 322 F.3d at 966.  In Modrowski, the Seventh Circuit noted that in 
addition to the attorney filing the habeas petition one day late, “[t]he petition was unsigned, 
missing the filing fee and exhibits, and had blank paragraphs where many of Modrowski’s 
constitutional claims should have been.” Id. at 966.  In Nara, the Third Circuit noted that the 
prisoner’s allegations that his attorney had “effectively abandoned” him halfway through the 
litigation when she failed to move his case forward, if found to be true in a factual hearing 
upon remand, would be enough for equitable tolling.  Nara, 264 F.3d at 320. 
 279. Nara, 264 F.3d at 320. 
 280. Modrowski, 322 F.3d at 966 (affirming the district court’s dismissal of Modrowski’s 
petition as untimely because attorney negligence does not warrant equitable tolling). 
 281. Upon remand, the Magistrate Judge found that equitable tolling should apply under 
Nara’s circumstances. Nara v. Frank, Civil Action No. 99-5, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6508, at 
*1 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2004), aff’d, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 282. Modrowski, 322 F.3d at 968. 
 283. Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 189 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming the district court’s order 
directing the Commonwealth to release Nara if it did not retry him within 120 days). 
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In similar fashion, when courts seek to apply the rules of professional 
responsibility, conduct that meets the threshold of “reasonably competent 
legal work” in one circuit may not pass muster in another.284  Accordingly, 
the Court’s rule requiring lower courts to distinguish between negligence 
and misconduct may lead to very inequitable results.   
This approach to equitable tolling also creates an ironic result in that 
prisoners will actually fare better the worse their attorney’s conduct 
becomes.  It is only if his attorney crosses the line to misconduct that the 
prisoner has a chance to receive equitable tolling in the case of attorney 
default.285  Equitable tolling is never granted for “ordinary” attorney 
negligence;286 therefore, if the attorney commits misconduct when filing the 
petition past AEDPA’s deadline, he is actually putting his client in a better 
position for equitable tolling than if he were merely negligent in missing the 
deadline.287  Accordingly, this result may create the perverse incentive for 
attorneys who are confused about AEDPA’s complex procedural 
requirements to abandon their clients’ cases, rather than attempt to better 
understand the law and risk the chance of filing the petitions late.  While it 
is difficult to believe that attorneys would deliberately commit misconduct 
in an effort to better serve their clients, the perverse incentive that this rule 
conceivably engenders certainly does not serve to improve the professional 
standards of conduct in the legal profession. 
2.  Due Diligence:  The Due Diligence Standard in the Context of Prison 
The Court also addressed the actions Albert Holland took in an effort to 
contact his attorney, obtain information about his case, and ultimately file 
his own pro se habeas petition when he realized his attorney had missed the 
deadline.  While the Court did establish that the standard for due diligence 
is “reasonable diligence” and not “maximum feasible diligence,”288 it left 
open the question that the courts of appeals had debated,289 namely, 
whether the specific circumstances of the prisoner’s confinement should be 
factored into the due diligence analysis.290  While the Court noted 
Holland’s repeated attempts to contact his attorney, the courts, and the 
Florida State Bar Association, it made no reference to the fact that Holland 
was doing all of this from inside the walls of prison,291 even though 
 
 284. That said, one could question how an attorney’s failure to file a petition on time and 
thereby extinguishing a client’s rights to federal habeas corpus review could ever be 
“reasonably competent” legal representation in any sense of the term. 
 285. See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
 286. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 287. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 288. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2565 (2010) (internal citations omitted). 
 289. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 290. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2565.  While the Court addressed the issue of Holland’s due 
diligence, it did not state whether it was considering the circumstances of his imprisonment 
into its analysis. 
 291. Id.  Justice Alito did not address the due diligence part of the equitable tolling test in 
his concurring opinion. Id. at 2565–68 (Alito, J., concurring).  Justice Scalia did not think 
that Holland had shown the requisite standard at all. Id. at 2576 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
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Holland urged the Court to take his imprisonment into account in his brief 
on the merits.292   
Nonetheless, in overturning the District Court’s determination that 
Holland did not act with the requisite diligence, the Court reviewed the 
actions Holland took in attempting to obtain information about his case 
when his attorney stopped communicating with him.293  Holland’s actions, 
however, were met with insurmountable barriers.  For example, the Clerk 
told Holland, an indigent prisoner, that he would have to pay seventy-seven 
dollars to obtain copies of his court records.294  As the ABA has found, 
most habeas corpus petitioners are indigent and cannot afford to pay court 
fees,295 an issue which greatly impacts a prisoner’s ability to show due 
diligence in obtaining information about his case.  If a prisoner cannot 
obtain information about a state court’s denial of his appeal, he will not be 
able to determine when his AEDPA clock begins running.296  Besides the 
difficulties in obtaining information about the prisoner’s specific case, often 
times prisoners have a hard time finding information about the law and 
AEDPA’s statute of limitations in the first place.  For example, prison 
libraries are often deficient and prisoners’ access to these libraries can be 
severely restricted.297  One court has even justified the use of equitable 
tolling on this basis, noting that even a diligent prisoner’s inability to learn 
about AEDPA due to prison law library deficiencies constituted 
extraordinary circumstances that prevented him from filing on time.298 
 
(stating that Holland could have pursued other reasonable measures, such as seeking 
permission to proceed pro se and formally discharging his attorney, instead of requesting that 
his attorney be replaced, in order to free himself from his attorney’s inadequate 
representation).  Justice Alito, however, noted in his concurring opinion that even Holland’s 
efforts to proceed pro se “were successfully opposed by the State on the perverse ground that 
the petitioner failed to act through appointed counsel.” Id. at 2568 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 292. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 125, at 59–60 (arguing that the due diligence 
requirement should be “construed in light of a habeas petitioner’s confinement in prison and 
any special restrictions that incarceration might impose on such a person”). 
 293. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2565 (noting that “Holland not only wrote his attorney 
numerous letters seeking crucial information and providing direction; he also repeatedly 
contacted the state courts [and] their clerks . . .”). 
 294. See supra text accompanying note 126. 
 295. See Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., The Defunding of the Post Conviction Defense 
Organizations as a Denial of the Right to Counsel, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 863, 902 (1996) 
(stating that habeas petitioners such as “[c]apital inmates almost uniformly are indigent”) 
(internal citations omitted); Stevenson, supra note 24, at 349 (describing that most habeas 
prisoners have “virtually no resources” with which to litigate in habeas proceedings). 
 296. See Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564 (noting that Holland’s attorney had “failed to inform 
Holland in a timely manner about the crucial fact that the Florida Supreme Court had 
decided his case”). 
 297. See Mello & Duffy, supra note 35, at 484 (noting that “many condemned inmates 
are prohibited from gaining physical access to the prison law library, which itself is often 
inadequate”).  Even the Fifth Circuit once explained that prisoners cannot use law libraries 
adequately without the aid of trained law librarians or paralegals. See Cruz v. Hauck, 627 
F.2d 710, 720–21 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that when determining if a prisoner has meaningful 
access to law libraries, “[i]t is not enough simply to say the books are there”). 
 298. See Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 970, 975 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that equitable 
tolling would be warranted when deficiencies in a prison library prevented a diligent pro se 
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Scholars and jurists have also argued that a habeas petitioner’s limited 
ability to communicate with the outside world is a barrier to his ability to 
diligently request information from, or monitor the conduct of, his 
defaulting attorney.299  For example, the petitioners in both Holland and 
Lawrence had no regular access to phones and were not permitted to use the 
Internet.300  Contacting a defaulting attorney while in prison is difficult, and 
thus courts should take the context of imprisonment into account when 
determining whether the prisoner was diligent. 
B.  Rationale:  Why Agency Law Principles are Unworkable in the        
Post-Conviction Context 
Both the majority opinion and the concurrence relied upon agency law 
principles to reach the conclusion that Holland should given equitable 
tolling upon remand if the lower court finds that his allegations of his 
attorney’s conduct are true.301  However, a deeper analysis reveals that 
agency law’s foundational principles are unworkable in the post-conviction 
context.  This section of the Comment discusses the Court’s and Justice 
Alito’s application of agency law in Holland, and evaluates the 
effectiveness of the agency doctrine in achieving just outcomes for 
prisoners whose attorneys fail to meet AEDPA’s statute of limitations 
deadline. 
As the Restatement of Agency makes clear, one of the founding 
principles of agency law is that the principal has the ability to control the 
agent.302  Accordingly, the attribution of the lawyer’s conduct to the client 
is appropriate because clients are the only parties that can direct and oversee 
 
prisoner from learning about the limitations period).  Holland also argued this point in his 
brief. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 125, at 21–22. 
 299. See, e.g., MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 17–18 (3d ed. 2002). See also 
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 209 (2005) (describing the increasing use of “Supermax” 
prisons as a form of incarceration that is extremely isolated and stating, “Opportunities for 
visitation are rare and are always conducted through glass walls.  Inmates are deprived of 
almost any environmental or sensory stimuli and of almost all human contact”). 
 300. See Brief for Petitioner at 11 n.25, Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327 (2007) (No. 
05-8820) (describing death row prisoner’s lack of access to a computer). Cf. Brief for 
Petitioner, supra note 125, at 2 n.1 (describing a habeas petitioner’s difficulties in contacting 
his attorney about the status of his case because death row inmates do not have access to 
computers). 
 301. See Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564–65 (referencing the Restatement of Agency); Id. at 
2566–68 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 302.  As the RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY explains, “[t]he agent shall act on the principal’s 
behalf and subject to the principal’s control.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 
(2006). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 26 cmt. b 
(2000) (explaining that the attribution of an attorney’s conduct to the client is appropriate 
because clients—as the parties involved in the case being litigated—are the only actors that 
can control the lawyer’s actions in the matter at hand); STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF 
LAWYERS:  PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 62 (2005).  Before Holland, the Seventh Circuit 
applied this premise of agency law in its jurisprudence.  For example, the Seventh Circuit 
once stated that, “‘petitioners, whether in prison or not, must vigilantly oversee the actions of 
their attorneys.’” Modrowski v. Mote, 322 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Johnson v. 
McCaughtry, 265 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
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their attorneys’ actions.303  Justice Alito echoed this reasoning in his 
concurrence, when he stated that ordinary attorney negligence is not a 
circumstance beyond the litigant’s control, therefore, it does not warrant 
equitable tolling.304  Yet in habeas corpus litigation, the Court and Justice 
Alito fail to consider that the clients in these agency relationships are 
incarcerated.305  Therefore, scholars have raised serious questions as to 
whether these clients can actually exercise supervisory control over their 
attorneys.  The first concern is that prisons have traditionally been built in 
remote places with highly restrictive visitor and mail policies.306  
Consequently, the simple fact that a habeas petitioner has limited ability to 
communicate with the outside world is a barrier to his ability to supervise 
his attorney.307  Second, because the majority of prisoners filing habeas 
corpus petitions receive appointed counsel, they are much less likely than a 
paying client to influence which tasks and priorities the lawyer will 
perform.308 
A second, and perhaps more significant flaw in the agency analysis in the 
post-conviction context, is Justice Alito’s discussion of a prisoner’s ability 
to respond to an attorney’s negligence versus an attorney’s misconduct.  In 
his concurrence, Justice Alito explained that a lawyer’s negligence is within 
the prisoner’s control,309 while a lawyer’s misconduct is not.310  And any 
circumstances that are within a prisoner’s control—such as an attorney’s 
gross negligence—cannot by definition be extraordinary circumstances that 
prevented a prisoner from filing his habeas petition.311  While Justice 
Alito’s distinction regarding a client’s ability to control his attorney’s 
 
 303. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 26 cmt. b (2000). 
 304. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2567 (Alito, J., concurring) (explaining “the principal 
rationale for disallowing equitable tolling based on ordinary attorney miscalculation is that 
the error of an attorney is constructively attributable to the client and thus is not a 
circumstance beyond the litigant’s control”) (emphasis added). 
 305. See Hearings on S. 2216, supra note 35, at 198 (statement of Phylis Skloot 
Bamberger on behalf of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association) (explaining that 
“virtually all habeas petitioners are prisoners”). 
 306. See MUSHLIN, supra note 299, at 17–18. 
 307. See supra notes 299–300 and accompanying text. 
 308. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 708 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(“It is an unfortunate but undeniable fact that a person of means, by selecting a lawyer and 
paying him enough to ensure he prepares thoroughly, usually can obtain better representation 
than that available to an indigent defendant, who must rely on appointed counsel, who, in 
turn, has limited time and resources to devote to a given case.”); see also Green, supra note 
27, at 1176. 
 309. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2567 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 310. Id. at 2568 (explaining that Holland’s allegations of his attorney’s misconduct would 
“suffice to establish extraordinary circumstances beyond his control”) (emphasis added). 
 311. See id. at 2567 (stating that an attorney’s gross negligence does not establish an 
extraordinary circumstance); see also Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336–37 (2007) 
(holding that attorney miscalculation of AEDPA’s deadline does not warrant equitable 
tolling).  Even before Holland, many of the circuit courts adopted similar reasoning. See, 
e.g., Smaldone v. Senkowski, 273 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that attorney error 
does not create the extraordinary circumstances equitable tolling requires); Harris v. 
Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[A] mistake by a party’s counsel in 
interpreting a statute of limitations does not present the extraordinary circumstance beyond 
the party’s control where equity should step in . . . .”). 
2010] ATTORNEY ERROR & AEDPA 1471 
actions may very well be a good standard for civil litigation between private 
litigants, his rationale is not practical in the post-conviction, AEDPA 
litigation context. 
It is difficult to understand how an incarcerated client, who most likely 
has little if any access to phones, computers, or Internet, and has absolutely 
no ability to show up at his attorney’s office for an in-person visit, could 
possibly have any more control over his attorney’s negligent behavior than 
he would over his attorney’s misconduct.  Putting Justice Alito’s examples 
of attorney negligence to the test illustrates this point.  For example, Justice 
Alito identified examples of attorney negligence as instances in which an 
attorney miscalculates the filing deadline, fails to do the appropriate 
research to determine the deadline, mails the petition to the wrong address, 
or simply forgets about the deadline altogether.312  How can a prisoner 
possibly be required to ensure that his attorney does not make these simple 
mistakes?  As the particular facts of Holland’s case prove, even when a 
prisoner is able to successfully research AEDPA’s law, determine his 
correct filing deadline under the law, and present his attorney with this 
information, the prisoner nonetheless cannot ultimately control his 
attorney’s failure to correctly comprehend AEDPA’s limitations 
requirement.313 
Moreover, Justice Alito stated that he would not allow equitable tolling if 
the prisoner’s attorney was negligent in mailing a client’s habeas petition to 
the wrong address.314  How could a client, who is confined inside a 
penitentiary, be expected to make sure his attorney does not mistakenly 
write an incorrect address on the envelope when submitting his federal 
habeas corpus petition?  If a client is expected to ensure the attorney is 
performing adequate legal research, double-check the attorney’s 
mathematical calculations of AEDPA’s complex tolling requirements, and 
review the address labels on mailing envelopes, one might inquire as to the 
point of having an attorney in the first place.  For these reasons, 
incarcerated clients cannot reasonably be expected to supervise their 
attorneys in the manner that the agency relationship assumes.315 
 
 312. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2567 (Alito, J., concurring).  In reference to these specific 
examples of attorney default, Justice Alito specifically emphasized that “the mere fact that a 
missed deadline involves ‘gross negligence’ on the part of counsel does not by itself 
establish an extraordinary circumstance.” Id. 
 313. Id. at 2564 (majority opinion) (noting that “Collins apparently did not do the 
research necessary to find out the proper filing date, despite Holland’s letters that went so far 
as to identify the applicable legal rules”). See also Modrowski v. Mote, 322 F.3d 965, 968 
(7th Cir. 2003) (“Even if a prisoner diligently checks an attorney’s references and 
disciplinary records, he still cannot prevent the attorney from bungling his case.  
Nonetheless, we hold the prisoner responsible for his attorney’s bungling.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 314. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2567 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 315. See Curtis & Resnik, supra note  26, at 1620 (demonstrating that clients have little or 
no ability to monitor criminal defense attorneys); Green, supra note 27, at 1170 (explaining 
that many criminal defense attorneys do not keep clients reasonably informed or comply 
with clients’ requests for information). 
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To be sure, many of the above mentioned examples of attorney 
negligence do not only affect prisoners, but also clients in civil cases who 
are not incarcerated.316  Although non-incarcerated clients in civil cases 
certainly have a greater ability to call, visit, and otherwise supervise their 
attorneys than prisoners do, such clients are not necessarily standing over 
their attorney’s shoulders to ensure that the attorney does not mail a petition 
to the wrong address.317  However, there are crucial differences in the 
application of agency principles in these two contexts.  First, the stakes are 
much higher in criminal cases than in civil cases—especially when an 
imminent execution is on the line—and second, civil clients have remedies 
available to them in the case of an attorney’s negligence that convicted 
prisoners do not.318  The agency relationship assumes that clients may 
recover monetary damages from injuries they sustain because of their 
attorneys’ actions by way of legal malpractice lawsuits.319  But a prisoner 
serving a life sentence or sitting on death row is not going to be 
compensated for his injury—an unjust incarceration or possibly an 
execution—by a monetary damages award.  Moreover, due to the 
complicated causation requirements involved in criminal legal malpractice 
lawsuits, commentators and practitioners have found that it is virtually 
impossible for a prisoner to obtain his desired relief, such as a fair trial or 
exoneration, through such actions.320  Furthermore, most habeas 
petitioners—as convicted prisoners—cannot even invoke the remedies of 
 
 316. See, e.g., Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 91 (1990) (discussing an 
attorney’s failure to timely file a client’s civil discrimination complaint against the Veteran’s 
Administration before the statute of limitations had run). 
 317. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2567 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 318. In civil legal malpractice actions, for example, a former client may sue the defendant 
attorney in tort or contract and must prove that the attorney either violated a duty of care or 
breached another fiduciary duty. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. d 
(2006); see also GILLERS, supra note 302, at 63.  In criminal malpractice suits, however, the 
great majority of courts nationwide require the former client to prove his actual innocence or 
obtain exoneration before he can sue his defense attorney for malpractice. See RONALD E. 
MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, 3 LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 27:13 (2010).  Due to the 
procedural hurdles that guard the door to criminal malpractice actions, scholars and 
commentators have demonstrated that this remedy is largely unavailable to clients who may 
have been harmed by negligent representation.  Id. at § 27:2 (noting that statistics compiled 
by the American Bar Association’s National Legal Malpractice Data Center show that claims 
against “criminal law practitioners account only for a small percentage of all [malpractice] 
claims”); Meredith J. Duncan, The (So-Called) Liability of Criminal Defense Attorneys:  A 
System in Need of Reform, 2002 BYU L. REV. 1, 40; Green, supra note 27, at 1195 (“It [is] 
almost impossible for aggrieved criminal defendants to prevail in a malpractice action, 
assuming they could find a lawyer to take their cases, because of doctrinal barriers.”).  
Moreover, in some jurisdictions public defenders are given absolute immunity from 
malpractice liability under state law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 53 cmt. d (2000); see also GILLERS, supra note 302, at 649. 
 319. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. d (2006). 
 320. See Meredith J. Duncan, Criminal Malpractice:   A Lawyer’s Holiday, 37 GA. L. 
REV. 1265–70 (2003).  The requirement to prove actual innocence or obtain post-conviction 
relief is needed for the defendant to prove the causation element of a malpractice tort claim, 
that “but for his counsel’s negligence, he would have been acquitted of the offense.” Id. at 
1279. 
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the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.321  
Because none of the remedies and procedures available to clients in a 
typical agency relationship apply to convicted prisoners, strict agency 
principles are not fairly applied in this context.  From a prisoner’s 
perspective, the Court’s line-drawing between attorney negligence and 
misconduct will only result in gross inequities. 
IV.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO CONTINUING PROBLEMS 
This Comment proposes to abrogate the Court’s negligence/misconduct 
rule, and instead offers a rule as follows:  in the absence of any evidence 
that a defendant was responsible for the attorney’s default, courts should 
allow equitable tolling for the prisoner while directly sanctioning the 
attorney.  This solution will uphold the fairness objectives of the writ of 
habeas corpus and is more effective in preventing attorney default than 
precluding prisoner’s habeas petitions as untimely. 
A.  Putting the “Equity” Back into Equitable Tolling 
The United States Supreme Court has held that in a criminal trial, the 
right to the effective assistance of counsel is one of the fundamental values 
of our democratic society.322  However, in an address to the American Bar 
Association, Justice Kennedy once lamented, “When someone has been 
judged guilty . . . the legal profession seems to lose all interest . . . .  When 
the door is locked against the prisoner, we do not think about what is behind 
it.”323 
The need for a wrongfully convicted prisoners to have access to post-
conviction relief is magnified by the dramatic increase in the number of 
prisoners across the country.324  This increasing prison population is in turn 
overburdening indigent defense systems, resulting in a greater likelihood of 
reversible error during criminal trials.325  Therefore, there is additional need 
for safeguarding the writ of habeas corpus to ensure that convictions are 
fair.326  Habeas petitioners are often unable to navigate the habeas process 
on their own, thus as a practical matter they are dependent on attorneys.327  
The post-conviction litigation system also functions more efficiently when 
attorneys participate.328  Thus, the State and the courts should be 
encouraging the use of attorneys in habeas litigation. 
However, courts should only encourage petitioners to entrust their 
cases—and in many situations their life and liberty—to an attorney if the 
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court can ensure the attorney-client relationship will treat the prisoner 
fairly.  As discussed above, the fundamental principles that maintain 
fairness in the agency relationship are generally inapplicable to habeas 
petitioners.329  Nor does the prisoner in the post-conviction context have an 
ineffective assistance of counsel remedy.330  As a result, there are no 
statutory or doctrinal protections for prisoners who suffer from an 
attorney’s default in this post-conviction context.  In order to uphold the 
writ of habeas corpus’s purpose of maintaining fairness to prisoners in the 
criminal justice system, the courts should allow equitable tolling for 
attorney default in the absence of any evidence that a defendant was 
responsible for the attorney’s failure to file a timely habeas petition. 
Under this proposed rule, the Court’s requirement that the prisoner prove 
he acted with due diligence331 is still relevant.  However, it is extremely 
difficult for an incarcerated prisoner in a remote penitentiary to show due 
diligence by attempting to supervise or control his attorney before the 
attorney misses the deadline.332  In order to produce a more just outcome, 
courts should evaluate whether the prisoner acted with diligence after the 
attorney default, from the point at which the prisoner actually becomes 
aware of the attorney’s failure.  Since equitable tolling is an equitable 
remedy, the court has discretion to change the way in which it is applied.333  
For example, the court could inquire into whether the prisoner was diligent 
in petitioning for equitable tolling after the prisoner has discovered or 
should have discovered the attorney default (i.e., did the prisoner wait five 
years after his attorney defaulted to request equitable tolling?).  By applying 
the due diligence requirement in this way, the criminal justice system will 
actually give prisoners a standard they can meet.  In fact, at least two of the 
circuit courts of appeals have already implemented the due diligence 
requirement in this manner—after the point at which the litigant became 
aware of the lawyer’s procedural default.334 
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Under this proposed rule there continues to be a consequence for the 
prisoner who sits on his rights, thus this type of due diligence requirement 
will still compel the prompt filings of habeas corpus petitions.  Applying 
the due diligence requirement in this way will serve the goal of judicial 
efficiency, yet not at the expense of fairness and justice. 
B.  Utilizing Ethical Disciplinary Systems To Deter Attorney Default 
“Ordinary negligence”335 should not be an acceptable standard of 
conduct for the legal profession.  Every jurisdiction requires attorneys to 
comply with ethical rules, and has a disciplinary system to reprimand 
attorneys who violate those rules.336  Courts and state bar associations have 
the power to regulate lawyers using these disciplinary systems.  In order to 
treat prisoners fairly, while enhancing the integrity of the criminal justice 
system by deterring attorney default, courts should utilize these disciplinary 
systems in habeas litigation. 
When an attorney fails to file a timely petition on behalf of a prisoner, the  
Court itself stated that an attorney is violating professional ethical rules.337  
Courts can therefore employ their disciplinary powers to reprimand 
attorneys who violate their professional duties of care.  The threat of 
disciplinary proceedings is much more likely to influence attorney behavior 
than the indirect punishment an attorney would theoretically receive in 
precluding his client’s claims.  As Justice William J. Brennan once 
remarked, “directly sanctioning the attorney is not only fairer but more 
effective in deterring violations” than sanctioning clients.338  In the post-
conviction context, criminal defense attorneys are typically public 
defenders who are not regulated by their clients through malpractice 
litigation or the demand in the market for legal services.339  Thus, it is left 
to the courts and state bar associations to regulate criminal defense 
attorneys. This method of discipline would obviate the need to punish 
attorneys indirectly through their clients.  Therefore, the court would be free 
to apply equitable tolling for prisoners who failed to file timely habeas 
petitions due solely to their attorney’s default. 
Finally, directly disciplining attorneys, rather than precluding their 
clients’ habeas corpus petitions, also serves AEDPA’s interest in making 
habeas litigation more efficient.340  Some commentators argue that 
foreclosing the use of equitable tolling for attorney default does not further 
the goal of efficiency.  Instead, they contend that the effect of AEDPA has 
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not been to reduce the amount of habeas filings, but has merely changed the 
nature of these filings.341  One commentator noted that “[AEDPA’s] 
[p]rocedural requirements have resulted in years of litigation and time-
consuming adjudication of technical issues often unrelated to constitutional 
protections.”342  Thus, by punishing clients rather than directly disciplining 
the attorneys themselves, AEDPA’s statute of limitations has not had its 
intended effect of making habeas litigation more efficient. 
CONCLUSION 
In the context of habeas litigation, a prisoner should not have to pay with 
his life or liberty for an attorney’s mistake.  The Court’s holding in Holland 
was a step in the right direction for protecting the fairness of the habeas 
corpus process, but did not go far enough in ensuring that attorneys do not 
become barriers to a prisoner’s right to due process.  Agency law is a 
valuable tool for maintaining fairness in the relationship between principals, 
agents, and third parties in civil litigation.  However, the interests of justice 
are not served by strictly applying agency principles in the post-conviction 
context.  Therefore, when an attorney becomes a barrier to the prisoner’s 
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